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Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization 
Kenneth A. Stahl* 
ABSTRACT 
Cities are increasingly taking the lead in tackling global issues like 
climate change, financial regulation, economic inequality, and others 
that the federal and state governments have failed to address. Recent 
media accounts have accordingly praised cities as the hope of our 
globally networked future. This optimistic appraisal of cities is, however, 
undermined by local governments’ cramped legal status. Under the 
doctrine of home rule, local governments can often only act in matters 
deemed “local” in nature and cannot regulate “statewide” issues that 
may have impacts beyond local borders. As a result, the global issues that 
local governments are being praised for confronting are, almost by 
definition, the very sort of matters that home-rule doctrine prohibits 
them from addressing. 
This Article has three goals: first, it aims to show why home rule has 
persisted in its present form despite its incompatibility with 
globalization; second, it explains some of the implications of our 
adherence to an outmoded conception of home rule; and third, it draws 
on these observations to suggest a new approach to home rule. I argue 
that the extant home-rule doctrine is part of an ideology that the 
judiciary finds attractive, called liberalism. Liberalism seeks to 
disaggregate various aspects of human life—the state, the market, and 
the family, particularly—and assign them to distinct spheres. The 
dichotomy between statewide and local affairs is a means of preserving 
the boundaries among the state, the market, and the family by tasking 
the state to regulate the marketplace and local governments to regulate 
the family. In light of globalization, however, it is clear that the liberal 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental, Land Use, and Real Estate Law 
Program, Chapman University Fowler School of Law. J.D., Yale, 2000; B.A., Michigan, 1997. 
For helpful comments, I would like to thank Jerry Frug, Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Donald 
Kochan, Ashira Ostrow, Tom Romero, Josephine Van Zeben, and participants at the Annual 
Local Government Law Works in Progress Conference, the Association for Law, Property, and 
Society, the Fordham Comparative Urban Law Colloquium, and the Southern California Law 
and Social Science Forum. 
04.STAHL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
178 
separation of spheres has had a different result. Following Karl Marx, 
scholars have argued that the separation of spheres has masked the 
dominance of capitalism, or, alternatively, the state, in all the 
putatively autonomous realms. Home rule has had precisely this effect. 
The idea that regulation of the family is local disguises the hegemonic 
role of the state in family matters, while the idea that commercial 
regulation is statewide has enabled mobile capital to overwhelm 
regulatory constraints. I propose a new model of home rule that is not 
married to obsolete notions of separate spheres, and thus enables the local 
to serve as a vital counterweight to capital and the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cities in the United States are increasingly taking on problems of 
global concern that the federal government and many state 
governments are unwilling or unable to address. While Congress is 
engaged in a farcical debate about whether human activity is 
contributing to climate change,1 cities are acting—unilaterally and in 
concert with other cities around the world—to promote sustainable 
development and limit their carbon emissions.2 As the federal 
government dithers on regulating the global financial industry that 
 
 1.  On January 21, 2015, the United States Senate voted 98-1 that climate change 
“is real and is not a hoax” as part of an amendment to an energy bill but rejected a second 
amendment that “climate change is real and human activity significantly contributes to 
climate change” by a 50-49 vote (60 votes being necessary for the amendment to pass). See 
Laura Barron-Lopez, Senate Votes That Climate Change Is Real, HILL (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:48 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/230316-senate-votes-98-1-that-
climate-change-is-real. The recent international Paris Climate Accord was deliberately 
framed as a nonbinding agreement rather than a treaty so as to avoid requiring ratification 
by the Senate. See Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2015, at A1. 
 2.  See Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable 
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537 (2009) (discussing how cities rather than nation-
states have become the front lines for fighting climate change and promoting sustainable 
development). A recent study by the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group reports that 228 
cities worldwide have so far pledged to cut carbon emissions by a total of 2.8 gigatons by 
2020. See C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP ET AL., WORKING TOGETHER: GLOBAL 
AGGREGATION OF CITY CLIMATE COMMITMENTS (2014), http://issuu.com/c40cities/docs/ 
global_aggregation_glossy_final_3__. 
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caused the devastating recession of 2008, cities are aggressively 
cracking down on dubious financial practices.3 And while the federal 
government stands idle in the face of mounting evidence that 
globalization has intensified socioeconomic inequality, cities have 
enacted living-wage laws and affordable-housing mandates in an 
effort to alleviate the impacts of inequality.4 On a range of other 
global issues including security, immigration, and even foreign 
policy, it is cities rather than state or federal governments that are 
now leading the way.5 In light of this emergent pattern, several 
 
 3.  Chicago, Los Angeles, and Miami, among other cities and counties, have brought 
suit against several financial institutions under the federal Fair Housing Act alleging that the 
institutions engaged in “predatory lending,” a broad label given to the practice of providing 
low-income home buyers with mortgage loans that are structured in such a way as to strip all 
the home’s equity. See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, City of 
Los Angeles v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-09009-ODW(RZx) (C.D. Cal. dismissed Oct. 7, 
2015); Complaint for Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, City of Los Angeles v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., No. 2:13-cv-9007-ODW(RZx), 2015 WL 4398858 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-56157 (9th Cir. July 29, 2015); Complaint, County of Cook v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., No. 1:14-cv-02280 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2014); Complaint for Violations of the Federal 
Fair Housing Act, City of Miami v. CitiGroup Inc., No. 1:13-cv-24510-CMA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
13, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 801 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2015); Complaint 
for Violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act, City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:13–
24506–JAL (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 
Sept. 1, 2015). These lawsuits have met with uneven success thus far, as some have been 
defeated by dispositive motions while others have survived the early motion stage. Compare 
Miami v. Citigroup, 801 F.3d (reversing district court’s holding that city lacked standing), and 
County of Cook v. HSBC North America Holdings, Inc., No. 14-cv-2031, 2015 WL 
5768575 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2015) (holding that city had standing to sue), with Los Angeles v. 
Wells Fargo, 2015 WL 4398858 (ordering summary judgment in favor of defendants), and 
County of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 115 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that 
city lacked standing to sue). 
 4.  The evidence of increasing socioeconomic inequality is now overwhelming, as 
Thomas Piketty’s celebrated work CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014) makes 
clear. On city efforts to address inequality, see, for example, Clayton P. Gillette, Local 
Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057 
(2007) (discussing merits of local living wage ordinances), and Matthew J. Parlow, Whither 
Workforce Housing?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1645 (2013) (discussing city efforts to increase 
stock of affordable housing). 
 5.  See, e.g., Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1619 (2008) (on cities’ regulation of immigration); Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 922–26 (2006) (on local governments’ adoption of 
international human rights laws). 
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recent accounts have foretold the death of the nation-state and 
praised cities as the hope of our globally networked future.6 
As is often the case, however, this optimistic appraisal of the local 
is undermined by cities’ cramped legal status.7 In the United States, 
most local governments are authorized to initiate legislation without 
a specific state delegation through the doctrine of home rule. 
Usually, though, local governments’ initiatory home-rule power is 
limited to matters deemed “local” in nature.8 Municipalities are 
prohibited from acting on issues that may have impacts outside their 
borders or impede regulatory uniformity throughout the state, 
which are deemed “statewide” in nature.9 
Therein lies the central problem this article sets out to resolve: 
the global issues that local governments are being praised for 
tackling are, almost by definition, the very sort of matters that 
current home-rule doctrine prohibits them from addressing. Any 
local effort to regulate financial activity, for example, will necessarily 
have extraterritorial impacts and result in statewide variations, given 
that financial institutions operate across a wide range of geographic 
jurisdictions whereas local authority is territorially bounded. 
Accordingly, courts have either invalidated or cast doubt upon local 
governments’ home-rule authority to undertake many of the 
 
 6.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL 
NATIONS, RISING CITIES (2013); BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN 
REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE 
ECONOMY (2013); Harold Meyerson, The Revolt of the Cities, AM. PROSPECT, May–June 
2014, at 30. 
 7.  The notion that law has constrained cities from assuming a more prominent place 
within our democratic system is a classic motif in local government law scholarship. See, e.g., 
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION (2008). 
 8.  About half of the states that have home rule follow the “imperio” or 
“constitutional” home rule model in which the home rule initiative power is limited to local 
matters. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 app. (2009) (listing home rule status for all fifty states). 
The other half follow the “legislative” model, which, in principle, does not contain such a 
limit. See id. Nevertheless, as I explain infra in Section III.A., courts in legislative states have 
generally restricted the home-rule initiative power to local matters under the guise of a 
preemption analysis. 
 9.  See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1349 (“[T]he two factors that seem to 
loom largest” in judicial determinations of whether a power is statewide or local are “the 
extraterritorial effects of the local regulation[] and the need for statewide uniformity in the 
relevant regulatory area.”). 
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measures cities have enacted to address the challenges of 
globalization, including financial regulation,10 living wage 
ordinances,11 labor laws,12 and affordable-housing mandates.13 
 
 10.  See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 929 (Cal. 
1991) (striking down municipal tax on financial institutions as conflicting with state statute 
and finding that such taxation is “a subject of statewide concern”). A number of courts have 
found local financial regulation ordinances preempted by state law, but as I discuss infra in 
Section I.A., the logic of these decisions suggests that local governments lack the home rule 
authority to regulate financial matters because such matters are inherently statewide. See Am. 
Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (finding municipal predatory 
lending ordinance impliedly preempted by state law because predatory lending is an inherently 
statewide matter); see also Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 
2006) (holding municipal predatory lending ordinance preempted by state statute); Mayor of 
New York v. Council of New York, 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that state 
predatory lending statute occupied the field and thus preempted local predatory 
lending ordinance). 
 11.  See, e.g., New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 
2d 1098, 1107–08 (La. 2002) (invalidating city minimum wage law as conflicting with state 
law on the subject and observing that “state regulation of minimum wage rates is of vital 
interest to the citizens of Louisiana”). The New Orleans case included a spirited debate among 
various justices about whether New Orleans had the home-rule authority to enact the 
minimum wage law in question and whether its status as a home-rule (or “charter”) city 
entitled its wage law to immunity from state preemption. See id. at 1108 (majority opinion); 
id. at 1108–11 (Calogero, C.J., concurring); id. at 1111–20 (Weimer, J., concurring); id. at 
1120–25 (Johnson, J., dissenting). But see New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 
126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding municipal minimum wage law as valid 
exercise of home-rule authority). 
 12.  See, e.g., McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834 (Md. 1990) (holding that 
municipality lacks home-rule authority to create cause of action for employment 
discrimination); Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1360–61 (“[C]ourts almost always rule 
that local interests give way to state interests in a general labor law.”). 
 13.  See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972) 
(holding that municipalities lack home rule authority to enact rent control ordinances); cf. 
Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000) (holding that 
local affordable housing ordinance was preempted by state law because state interest in 
uniform regulation trumps local interest in ensuring affordable housing for local residents); 
Greater Bos. Real Estate Bd. v. City of Boston, 705 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1999) (invalidating 
local ordinance giving tenants certain rights when rental building is converted to 
condominiums as exceeding scope of home rule power). 
In some cases, the courts have struck down municipal ordinances dealing with labor laws 
or affordable housing on the grounds that home rule grants prohibit local governments from 
regulating “private law.” See, e.g., Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 260 
N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1970). Though the origins and underlying rationale for the “private law 
exception” to home rule are mysterious, it is commonly believed that the exception is rooted 
in a desire for statewide uniformity with respect to certain matters. See Gary T. Schwartz, The 
Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671, 687–90, 750–56 
(1973). Thus, the exception is consistent with the broader doctrinal principle that local 
governments’ home rule authority does not extend to matters requiring statewide uniformity. 
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If home rule thus constrains local governments from effectively 
addressing the challenges of globalization, it also empowers them in 
a way that creates a similar problem. Though home rule drastically 
limits what cities can do in many areas, critics have long assailed 
home rule for giving local governments too much power in one 
specific area: land-use control.14 Courts consider land use to be a 
paradigmatically “local” matter and afford local governments wide-
ranging home-rule authority with respect to land use.15 Ironically, 
local land-use control often creates substantial statewide variations 
and extraterritorial impacts; for instance, one municipality’s decision 
to build a new housing development may increase traffic on roads in 
neighboring communities. Though uniformity and extraterritoriality 
are often critical factors in judicial determinations about home-rule 
power in other subject-matter areas, courts rarely invalidate an 
exercise of the land-use power for these reasons.16 The ability of local 
governments to regulate land use without regard to extraterritorial 
impacts encourages municipalities to act in narrowly self-interested 
ways and often prevents them from cooperating to address global 
concerns. As an example, under the authority of home rule, 
communities frequently engage in “exclusionary zoning,” a practice 
of de facto or de jure exclusion of unwanted land uses such as low-
 
 14.  As David Barron points out in his now-classic article Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2288–322 (2003), it has long been the conventional scholarly wisdom 
that home rule gives local governments too much power. Barron’s article challenged this 
conventional wisdom and argued that home rule as currently structured both empowers and 
limits local governments in important ways. 
 15.  See infra notes 117–24 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra note 125 and accompanying text. Previous scholars have argued that local 
governments’ inability to act extraterritorially has inhibited them from tackling issues such as 
sprawl. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 14, at 2345–62; Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, 
Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1271, 1297–302 (2009). It is 
important, though, to distinguish between a municipality regulating land use outside its 
borders, which courts generally prohibit, and a municipality regulating land within its borders 
in a way that creates impacts outside its borders, which courts typically permit. It is this 
combination of powers and limitations that causes local governments to act parochially in land 
use matters—since they cannot regulate outside their borders but can regulate within their 
borders so as to cause external impacts, each municipality acts in its own interest and ignores 
the regional impacts of its activity. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State 
Preemption, Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 445, 456–61 (2012). 
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income housing.17 Exclusionary zoning by one community shifts the 
burden of accommodating these undesirable, but regionally 
necessary, land uses onto neighboring communities, but those 
communities often reciprocate by enacting similar zoning laws.18 The 
result is a regional shortage of affordable housing and increasing 
suburban sprawl as developers are forced to look beyond existing 
communities for places to build new housing.19 Exclusionary zoning 
thus exacerbates economic inequality by raising the cost of housing 
and contributes to climate change by increasing vehicle-miles 
travelled and the consumption of undeveloped land. 
In short, insofar as home rule both empowers and constrains 
local governments based on the idea that there is a fixed sphere of 
“local” authority within which their power is absolute and outside of 
which they are impotent, home rule prevents municipalities from 
meaningfully addressing global issues such as climate change, 
economic inequality, and others. One way to solve this problem 
would be to change the meaning of home rule so that state and local 
governments no longer have separate and impregnable domains, 
allowing the allocation of power between state and local 
governments to be adjusted as the challenges of globalization 
demand. Nevertheless, despite some efforts at reform,20 the notion 
of home rule as confined to the “local” has been persistent in 
our jurisprudence. 
While previous scholars have criticized the state/local distinction 
in home-rule doctrine,21 none have examined why the current model 
of home rule has proven so difficult to dislodge from our 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1132 (2007) 
(discussing a common criticism of home rule: it enables and encourages exclusionary zoning). 
 18.  See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1134 (1996) (“When one locality acts to exclude a use, its 
neighbors may feel compelled to adopt comparable regulations to protect themselves from the 
growth they fear will be directed to them by the initial locality’s regulation.”). 
 19.  See Barron, supra note 14, at 2257–77; 2334–84 (explaining how home rule 
worsens affordable-housing crises and suburban sprawl). 
 20.  See infra at notes 283–92 and accompanying text (discussing “legislative” home 
rule reforms). 
 21.  See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 16, at 1290–91; Barron, supra note 14, at 2347, 
2349–50; cf. Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an 
Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 556–57 (2010) (noting 
fluidity of distinction between global and local). 
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jurisprudence or fully explored the implications of our adherence to 
an outmoded model of home rule in an era of globalization. Any 
successful reform effort must grapple with these questions. 
Accordingly, Part I argues that home rule endures in its current form 
because it is consistent with an ideology the judiciary finds attractive, 
called liberalism. Liberalism attempts to disaggregate the various 
aspects of human life—the state, the market, and the family, 
particularly—and assign them to distinct, territorially demarcated 
spheres. The statewide/local distinction is a means of preserving the 
boundaries among the state, the market, and the family, specifically 
by tasking the state to regulate the marketplace and local 
governments to regulate the family. This division of power helps 
explain why courts so often invalidate local commercial and financial 
regulation, which are perceived as affecting the sphere of the 
marketplace, while deferring widely to local regulations regarding 
land use and public schools, which are perceived as affecting the 
home and family. 
In light of globalization, however, it has become clear that the 
liberal separation of spheres is a largely futile and, in fact, 
counterproductive enterprise. Hence, Part II provides a normative 
critique of the extant model of home rule. This Part begins by 
drawing on the insights of Karl Marx, who saw liberalism as a 
hopelessly naïve effort to cabin the influence of global capitalism. In 
his view, the liberal separation of spheres in fact did nothing but 
reinforce and obfuscate capitalism’s dominance. Subsequently, 
scholars in both law and geography have followed Marx’s analysis 
and shown that the state uses territory (the notion that a political 
authority exercises control over everything within a particular place 
rather than over specific individuals or conduct22) to reinforce and 
disguise both its own hegemony and that of capitalism. Home rule is 
a case in point. Assigning the market and the family to distinct 
 
 22.  See Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: A Theory, 73 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 55, 56 (1983) (defining territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group 
(x) to influence, affect, or control objects, people, and relationships (y) by delimiting and 
asserting control over a geographic area”); see also SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, 
RIGHTS 6 (updated ed. 2008) (defining territorial sovereignty as meaning that an entity has 
“exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time this territory is constructed as 
coterminous with that authority”); id. at 41–53 (explaining how medieval cities destabilized 
feudal authority by substituting impersonal relationship between the sovereign and the 
territory in place of in-kind, personal relationships that undergirded feudalism). 
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territorial spheres (the state and the local, respectively) masks the 
nature of the relationship among the supposedly autonomous 
spheres. On one hand, the idea that commercial regulation is 
statewide in nature precludes local governments from regulating the 
financial sector and thus enables capital investors to treat land as a 
commodity rather than a community resource. On the other hand, 
the notion that regulation of home and family is a peculiarly local 
responsibility provides a veneer of local control while disguising the 
hegemonic role of the state in regulating family affairs. For instance, 
though exclusionary zoning appears to be a parochial policy choice 
by selfish municipalities, it is in fact largely an imperative that has 
been foisted on municipalities by state policies regarding public 
school financing. The effect of the liberal separation of spheres is 
thus to perpetuate the dominance of the state and mobile capital 
over the local, and to suppress local governments’ potential role in 
global governance. 
On the surface, home-rule doctrine thus suits the agenda of both 
the state and capital. As Marx predicted, however, globalization has 
caused the alliance between the state and capitalism to unravel as the 
increasing mobility of capital across porous borders has weakened 
the ability of the territorially bounded state to regulate it. I argue 
that the state’s best hope of reining in capital is to reinvigorate the 
local, because despite capital’s mobility it is deeply dependent on 
cities, and cities have powerful incentives to regulate capital. In 
short, home rule has matters precisely backwards in entrusting the 
state rather than the local to regulate the marketplace. In Part III, I 
propose a new conception of home rule that recognizes the vitality 
of the local in our global age but resists the temptation to carve out 
a fixed sphere for the local. Appropriately, in light of the challenges 
of globalization, I find the inspiration for this potential new model 
of home rule in the realm of international law and governance.  
I. LIBERALISM, THE SEPARATION OF SPHERES, AND IMPERIO 
HOME RULE 
A. The Illogic of Home Rule 
As the Introduction pointed out, the manner in which home rule 
both limits and empowers municipalities makes it difficult for them 
to take on global challenges. To illustrate the basic problem, this 
Section discusses two cases, American Financial Services Ass’n v. City 
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of Oakland23 and DeVita v. County of Napa,24 both decided by the 
California Supreme Court. American Financial Services addressed an 
effort by the city of Oakland to regulate predatory lending, a 
dubious financial practice that contributed to the 2008 global 
recession. The court effectively held that local governments lacked 
the home-rule authority to enact legislation in this area because 
predatory lending requires uniform treatment throughout the state 
and is thus a matter of statewide rather than local concern.25 DeVita 
addressed a land-use regulation enacted by Napa County that 
drastically reduced development throughout the county. As I have 
already observed, such a regulation would likely increase suburban 
sprawl and raise local housing costs. Moreover, as the dissent noted, 
Napa’s move would put pressure on neighboring communities to 
enact similarly restrictive zoning laws and thus further increase 
sprawl, carbon emissions, and home prices.26 Despite these clear 
extraterritorial impacts, the court held that the Napa regulation was 
valid because land use is a local rather than a statewide function.27 
Viewing these cases in tandem, it becomes clear that the California 
Supreme Court selectively applies its supposed concerns about 
uniformity and extraterritoriality. As I will demonstrate in the 
remainder of this Part, what really drives the judicial analysis is the 
notion that commercial regulation is inherently a matter of statewide 
concern because it implicates the marketplace, whereas land-use 
regulation is inherently a matter of local concern because it 
implicates the family. This conclusion begs the question of how to 
truly distinguish commercial regulation from land-use regulation, a 
question I take up in the next Part. 
1. Home rule and predatory lending: American Financial Services 
Ass’n v. City of Oakland 
In the postmortem on the global economic recession that began 
in 2008, many critics pointed the finger squarely at the failure of 
 
 23.  104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005). 
 24.  889 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 1995). 
 25.  See infra notes 35–42 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 27.  See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
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nation-states to more assertively regulate the financial industry.28 
Before the crash, financial institutions deployed a number of risky 
and esoteric new mortgage instruments to squeeze the maximum 
amount of profit from a booming real estate market.29 Expanding the 
pool of mortgage loans was critical to this enterprise, so financial 
institutions for the first time began marketing loans to low-income 
borrowers with bad or no credit, the “subprime” market. To induce 
subprime borrowers, lenders engaged in a variety of tactics often 
referred to as “predatory lending,” such as offering low introductory 
“teaser” rates that later ballooned, lending without regard to a 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan, deceiving borrowers or failing to 
disclose important information to borrowers, and so on.30 Although 
predatory loans were structured in such a way as to make 
foreclosures highly likely, with attendant risks for both the borrowers 
and the real estate market at large, federal and state governments did 
little to regulate the mortgage industry even as predatory loans 
began to flood the marketplace; to the contrary, these governments 
actively engaged in de-regulating the financial markets so that 
lenders would continue extending mortgage loans to subprime 
borrowers.31 Of course, once a critical mass of subprime loans 
predictably ended in foreclosure, consumers lost confidence in the 
real estate market and home prices sharply declined, sparking the 
financial crisis.32 
If federal and state governments were blind to the risks of 
predatory lending in the run-up to the financial crisis, city 
governments were not. During the real estate boom, cities 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Antony Page, Revisiting the Causes of the Financial Crisis, 47 IND. L. REV. 
37 (2014) (arguing that deregulation was one of the major causes of the financial crisis); Adam 
J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1181–82 
(2012) (arguing that the failure to regulate mortgage industry was the “leading cause” of the 
financial crash). 
 29.  See generally Levitin & Wachter, supra note 28. 
 30.  See Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and Predatory 
Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 759–62 (2007) (describing some predatory lending 
practices); Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Comment, Defrauding the American Dream: Predatory 
Lending in Latino Communities and Reform of California’s Lending Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 
1279, 1286 (2009) (describing some predatory lending practices). 
 31.  See Page, supra note 28, at 52–54 (arguing that federal government failed to 
sufficiently regulate subprime mortgage industry prior to the crash). 
 32.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008). 
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throughout the United States enacted tough restrictions on 
predatory lending practices under their home-rule authority.33 While 
federal and state governments were concerned about increasing 
liquidity in the mortgage market at the state and national level, city 
governments were focused more on the negative localized impacts of 
predatory lending practices—residents saddled with mountains of 
debt and neighborhoods devastated by swaths of deteriorating, 
abandoned homes. Perhaps the reason cities were more attuned than 
the state or federal government to these impacts was that predatory 
lending was highly concentrated in urban areas with large numbers 
of low-income people of color.34 Thus, it would seem that localities 
were ideally positioned, and certainly better positioned than state 
and federal authorities, to police predatory lending practices. 
However, in most cases—including the highest profile cases in 
New York, Cleveland, and Oakland—the courts invalidated 
municipal predatory lending ordinances.35 As an example, let us 
consider the Oakland case, American Financial Services Ass’n v. City 
of Oakland.36 In this case, the California Supreme Court held that 
Oakland’s predatory lending ordinance was preempted by a much 
weaker state law dealing with the same matter.37 The ruling was 
curious because the standard for preemption in California is that 
state legislation must demonstrate a clear intent to preempt local 
activity,38 yet, as the dissent observed, the evidence in this case 
decisively pointed against any such legislative intent.39 Indeed, the 
 
 33.  See Entin & Yazback, supra note 30, at 770–80. 
 34.  Cities like Oakland were “prime targets” for predatory lending practices “because 
of the high number of minority and lower-income homeowners,” as well as “the pressures of 
gentrification in certain neighborhoods that increase property values and home equity.” 
Fuentes, supra note 30, at 1282 n.23 (quoting the Oakland ordinance); see also Entin & 
Yazback, supra note 30, at 757 (“Predatory lending is heavily concentrated in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods and disproportionately affects minorities and the elderly.”). 
 35.  For a discussion of the New York, Cleveland, and Oakland cases, see Entin & 
Yazback, supra note 30, at 770–80. 
 36.  104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005). 
 37.  See id.; see also Fuentes, supra note 30, at 1282 (“The Oakland ordinance provided 
additional protections including: requiring independent loan counseling; prohibiting lending 
without regard to repayment ability; prohibiting the financing of points and fees; and 
prohibiting lenders from recommending default or refinancing without borrower benefit.”). 
 38.  See Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 829–30 (George, C.J., dissenting) (citing Sherwin–
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 844 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1993)). 
 39.  See id. at 830–31. 
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state legislature carefully considered whether to preempt local 
predatory lending ordinances such as Oakland’s and chose not to 
include any preemption language in the final bill.40 The court 
nevertheless found that the legislature had impliedly preempted 
Oakland’s ordinance because, according to the court, the matter of 
predatory lending is inherently statewide rather than local in 
nature.41 The court reasoned that statewide uniformity in the 
regulation of predatory lending was essential to ensuring that 
subprime borrowers would have access to low-cost credit and that 
Oakland’s ordinance would, if duplicated elsewhere, lead to a 
proverbial crazy-quilt of local predatory lending regulation.42 
The court’s reasoning was notable for what it implied about the 
limits of local regulatory authority. Oakland’s ordinance was 
preempted not because of anything the legislature said or failed to 
say, but because of the court’s own conclusion that predatory 
lending requires uniform statewide regulation and is therefore not an 
appropriate subject of local regulatory activity. In short, though 
formally styled as a preemption case, the court treated it more as a 
question of Oakland’s home-rule authority. Under home-rule 
doctrine, Oakland would have the inherent power to regulate 
predatory lending if the matter were local in nature and no power to 
act if the matter were statewide in nature, regardless of state 
legislative intent.43 In substance, the court held that Oakland lacked 
the home-rule authority to enact a predatory lending ordinance 
because predatory lending is not a local matter.44 As a result, cities 
 
 40.  See id.; Fuentes, supra note 30, at 1281–82, 1281 n.18 (noting that the financial 
industry had actively lobbied for an express preemption provision in the state bill and leaving 
out such a provision was a “concession” to the consumer advocates who wanted to leave room 
for stronger local laws). 
 41.  See Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 823. 
 42.  See id. at 823–24. 
 43.  See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1340–49 (describing the “imperio” model 
of home rule, under which state and local governments have mutually exclusive spheres of 
regulatory authority). 
 44.  If my interpretation is correct, it means that Oakland would be unable to enact 
predatory lending regulation even in the absence of state legislation dealing with predatory 
lending. The American Financial Services court did not address this point, but the point is 
largely moot in any event because the court’s expansive reading of the scope of state 
preemption, see supra text accompanying notes 38–41, effectively nullifies municipalities’ home 
rule power to initiate legislation. See also infra note 135 (making a similar point about Town of 
Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000)). 
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like Oakland were left vulnerable to Wall Street’s financial 
manipulations, and the real estate crash had predictably harmful 
impacts in those cities.45 
2. Home rule and land-use planning: DeVita v. County of Napa 
If home rule often prevents local governments from dealing with 
global challenges by prohibiting them from acting in areas such as 
financial regulation, it simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, 
prevents them from addressing global challenges by empowering 
them in a way that incentivizes them to act parochially. In this 
regard, it is useful to contrast American Financial Services with the 
case of DeVita v. County of Napa.46 DeVita concerned the question 
whether voters within a county could adopt, by initiative, a change 
to the land-use element of a county’s general plan (a document all 
California cities are required to adopt as a sort of “constitution” to 
guide the municipality’s land-use regulation) to designate large 
swaths of the county as undevelopable open space. The dissent 
argued intently that the local voters could not amend the land-use 
element by initiative because the matter of land-use planning was 
statewide in nature rather than local.47 According to the dissent, 
land-use decisions by a single municipality “may have profound 
ramifications for neighboring entities, the region[,] and the state” 
and, therefore, the adoption of a general plan is a matter of statewide 
interest.48 The dissent noted, in fact, that the plan amendment 
adopted by the voters of Napa County, which placed thousands of 
acres of land in a highly desirable region of California off limits for 
development, was “clearly intended to limit and redirect the county’s 
future development of housing stock, with a view to influencing 
metropolitan growth patterns throughout the region.”49 Napa’s 
 
 45.  The uncertainty surrounding local governments’ home rule authority to enact 
predatory lending ordinances has induced many local governments to bring either parens 
patriae suits on behalf of predatory lending victims against financial institutions alleged to have 
engaged in predatory lending under existing state consumer protection laws or suits under the 
Federal Fair Housing Act (FHA). As described previously, courts have so far reached divergent 
conclusions as to the viability of these suits. See supra note 3 (collecting cases). 
 46.  889 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 1995). 
 47.  See id. at 1053–58 (Arabian, J., dissenting). 
 48.  Id. at 1053. 
 49.  See id. at 1056. 
04.STAHL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
192 
move would necessarily push growth pressures onto neighboring 
communities, which would likely be forced to respond by similarly 
limiting densities, decreasing the stock of affordable housing in the 
region and increasing sprawl. The general plan change would thus 
make it more difficult for California to implement uniform regional 
or statewide goals with regard to affordable housing, climate change, 
or other aspects of land-use planning. In this regard, the dissent’s 
reasoning was consistent with the American Financial Services 
court’s concern about the deleterious impacts of local predatory 
lending regulation on statewide uniformity. 
Nevertheless, the court in DeVita held that the voters of Napa 
could validly enact the plan change by initiative because land-use 
planning was an issue of local rather than statewide concern.50 In 
response to the dissent’s argument regarding the disuniformities and 
extraterritorial impacts of local land-use regulation, the court 
answered that the state had the authority to preempt local land-use 
regulation with such impacts but had evidenced no intention do so.51 
While this reasoning makes sense on its face, it stands at odds with 
American Financial Services. In American Financial Services, as I 
have just observed, there was similarly no evidence of an intent to 
preempt local predatory lending regulation—in fact, there was 
substantial evidence of a contrary intent—but the court found 
Oakland’s predatory lending ordinance impliedly preempted merely 
because of the likely effect the ordinance would have on statewide 
uniformity. Thus, the two cases are almost precise mirror images. 
There is one way to distinguish these cases, however. The DeVita 
court held that land use was a local matter because it had 
“historically been a function of local government.”52 In American 
Financial Services, conversely, the court noted that financial 
regulation was historically a function carried out by the state, and 
Oakland’s predatory lending ordinance was evidently the first time a 
municipality in California had undertaken to regulate such activity.53 
Thus, the two cases may be understood as resting on “traditional” 
notions of statewide and local powers, respectively. Reconciling the 
 
 50.  See id. at 1032 (majority opinion). 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See id. at 1030–31. 
 53.  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 822–23 (Cal. 2005). 
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cases in this way only raises more questions, however. The 
conclusion that land-use control is a traditional local function 
whereas financial regulation is a traditional state function leads to the 
descriptive question of how those functions came to be vested at 
those particular levels as well as the normative question of why those 
functions should be vested there.54 These are especially salient 
questions considering that, as we have already seen, Oakland was 
apparently far better suited than the state of California to regulate 
predatory lending, whereas localities such as Napa County seem 
rather poorly positioned to take on the challenges of climate change 
and affordable housing. The statewide/local distinction, in other 
words, does not properly allocate power in this age of globalization. 
As the remainder of this Part explains, the “traditional” division 
of power between state and local is a component of a liberal project 
of nation-building. Specifically, liberal ideology required that the 
various “spheres” of human activity, most notably the state, the 
market, and the family, be rigidly separated (both conceptually and, 
in some ways, physically). The construction of a firm state/local 
dichotomy is an effort to maintain that separation, as is the 
assignment of financial regulation to the state level and land-use 
control to the local level. In the next Part, I will demonstrate that 
the separation of spheres has not quite worked as intended; in fact, it 
has served as an illusion that effectively disguises the dominance of 
the state and mobile capital over the local. 
 
 54.  In light of my thesis below that the circular “traditional function” inquiry actually 
reflects liberal ideology’s division of governmental power into distinct territorial spheres, it is 
noteworthy that the courts have used this inquiry in several other contexts to either draw the 
line between public and private spaces, or to delineate firm borders between scales of 
governmental authority. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672 (1992) (deciding whether government must permit free speech activity on public property 
depends on whether the area is a “traditional” public forum); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress may not interfere in traditional state functions 
even if acting pursuant to an enumerated power), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Importantly, the Usery doctrine proved short lived 
precisely because the Court could not articulate a principled definition of traditional 
government functions. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. As the discussion in the text demonstrates, 
however, and as we shall see further in Part III, the courts have not entirely abandoned their 
efforts to determine fixed boundaries between scales of governmental authority. And 
“tradition” still plays a role in determining those boundaries. 
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B. The Liberal Art of Separation 
1. “Liberalism is a world of walls” 
 A signature characteristic of the modern nation-state—what 
separates it decisively from medieval regimes—is the fracturing of 
society into several distinct and autonomous spheres. Medieval 
society was “conceived as an organic and integrated whole.”55 There 
was no distinction between the state and civil society. Corporate 
entities such as guilds, churches, and cities were simultaneously 
regulatory authorities, business enterprises, cultural and educational 
institutions, and organizers of social life. The modern state, however, 
has disaggregated these corporate bodies into a “public” sphere of 
coercive authority subordinate to the state and a “private” sphere of 
purely volitional activity subsumed within civil society, which is 
conceptualized as autonomous from the state.56 Both the public 
(state) and the private (civil society) realms have in turn been 
subdivided into distinct sub-spheres. State power is allocated among 
discrete scalar units of governmental power—in the United States, 
federal, state, and local—whereas civil society is comprised of 
separate domains such as the market and the family.57 These spheres 
have juridical significance: for instance, courts freely enforce 
commercial contracts on the theory that the marketplace is a realm 
of arm’s-length dealing between abstract individuals but refuse to 
enforce contracts between spouses on the principle that the marriage 
relationship is governed by affection and altruism.58 
The separation of spheres has often been considered a 
cornerstone of the ideology of “liberalism,” which posits that 
individual freedom can only be secured when each realm of human 
 
 55.  See Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315, 
315 (1984). 
 56.  The public/private distinction under modern liberal ideology has been extensively 
explored by legal scholars, particularly with reference to local government law. See, e.g., Gerald 
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083–90 (1980) (asserting that 
the public/private distinction has been critical in establishing local governments’ subordinate 
legal status); Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American 
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985) (book review). 
 57.  A classic discussion of the family/market divide in the law review literature is 
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
 58.  See id. at 1520–22. 
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activity is sealed off from interference by the others. According to 
Michael Walzer, one of the most vigorous defenders of this ideology, 
“Liberalism is a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty.”59 
Crafting an autonomous sphere for the market enables private 
economic activity to take place free from both state interference60 
and the sentimental distractions of the family,61 while designating a 
sphere for family life facilitates a right of privacy against state 
intrusion as well as a refuge from the crass commercialism of the 
marketplace.62 The state itself is also “liberated” by the separation of 
spheres, as it can theoretically expel the influence of money63 and 
family ties64 from the political sphere, assert a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of coercion (since the market and the family are seen 
as spheres of private, voluntary activity), and assume a posture of 
universality by defining the boundaries between the market and the 
family—such as by legislating maximum working hours or 
prohibiting child labor.65 As I show later in this Part, one other 
 
 59.  Walzer, supra note 55, at 315. Walzer most extensively defends the liberal 
separation of spheres in his celebrated book SPHERES OF JUSTICE. MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). 
 60.  See Walzer, supra note 55, at 316 (“[T]he separation of civil society and political 
community creates the sphere of economic competition and free enterprise, the market in 
commodities, labor, and capital.”). 
 61.  See Olsen, supra note 57, at 1520–21 (noting that liberal ideology considered the 
cooperative ethos of the family counterproductive in the market sphere where “self-interested 
behavior . . . not only was acceptable, but also benefited society in general”). 
 62.  See WALZER, supra note 59, at 300 (noting that protection of the “domestic 
sphere” from market and political interference provides “a space for withdrawal, rest, intimacy, 
and (sometimes) solitude”); Olsen, supra note 57, at 1504 (noting that family is both “the 
repository for values being destroyed in the marketplace,” and “the sanctuary of privacy into 
which one can retreat to avoid state regulation”). 
 63.  See Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 31, 33–
34 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (observing that the state is “emancipated” from civil 
society by expelling economic considerations from the political sphere). The clearest concrete 
example of this form of emancipation—and one strikingly observed by Marx one hundred 
years before the modern civil rights movement—is the abolition of property qualifications for 
voting, which eliminates wealth as a criterion for political participation. See id. at 33; see also 
Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Government, “One Person, One Vote,” and the Jewish Question, 49 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2014) (analyzing Marx’s discussion of voting rights in context of 
the modern “one person, one vote” rule). 
 64.  See Walzer, supra note 55, at 316–17 (noting that the separation of family and state 
through abolition of dynastic government and nepotism “creates the sphere of office and then 
the freedom to compete for bureaucratic and professional place”). 
 65.  See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, Money, Time, Space and the City, in CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
THE URBAN EXPERIENCE 1, 31 (1985). 
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important way in which the state has maintained the separation 
between the market and the family, as well as its own distance from 
the realm of civil society, is through the scalar division of power into 
federal, state, and local spheres. 
The separation of spheres had a liberating effect on another 
institution as well: the judiciary. The ascendancy of liberalism 
coincided with the rise of a “classical” mode of jurisprudential 
thinking. As Morton Horwitz writes, judges worried about “the 
dangerous and unstable redistributive tendencies of democratic 
politics” during the nineteenth century and they sought to create a 
“neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine and legal reasoning” 
that would “sharply separate law from politics.”66 They did this, 
according to Duncan Kennedy, by positing that the legal system was 
populated by a set of distinct institutions—such as the state and the 
market—each of which “was absolute within but void outside its 
sphere.”67 Under this legal system, “[t]he role of the judiciary (its 
sphere of absolute power) was the application of a single, 
distinctively legal, analytic apparatus to the job of policing the 
boundaries of these spheres.”68 Determining the boundaries between 
the spheres was, moreover, not a political or democratic task, but an 
“objective, quasi-scientific one.”69 
What enables this judicial task to appear objective is that each 
sphere takes on the quality of being something natural and pre-
political, rather than something that is consciously constructed by 
the state. In a classic law review article on the market/family 
dichotomy, Frances Olsen describes that dichotomy as a “structure 
of consciousness,” meaning “a shared vision of the social universe 
that underlies a society’s culture and also shapes the society’s view of 
what social relationships are ‘natural’ and, therefore, what social 
reforms are possible.”70 Under this structure of consciousness, “[t]he 
 
 66.  See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1425–26 (1982). 
 67.  See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: 
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 7 (1980). 
 68.  Id. at 5. 
 69.  Id. at 7. 
 70.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1498. 
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status quo itself is treated as something natural and not as the 
responsibility of the state.”71 
Thus, liberalism has had two distinct advantages for the judiciary: 
first, it enables the courts to effectively check redistribution by 
keeping the state out of the private sphere; and second, it legitimizes 
the judiciary as an impartial institution peculiarly suited to the 
essential task of separating the various spheres.  
One lingering question about the classical approach to 
jurisprudence is its currency. Kennedy and Horwitz largely treat 
classical jurisprudence as a historical relic, whereas Olsen 
characterizes it as an extant and predominant jurisprudential mode. 
As I will argue below in Section 3, home-rule doctrine demonstrates 
that classical juridical thinking still persists within local 
government law. 
2. Liberalism in space (civil society): The separate spheres ideology 
My task in this Part is to explain how the distribution of 
governmental power between the state and local spheres via the 
doctrine of home rule reinforces the liberal division among the state, 
the market and the family. Relatedly, I will also show how the 
state/local distinction burnishes the judiciary’s credentials as an 
arbiter of the boundaries between the spheres. As a starting point, it 
must be understood that liberalism has a strong spatial or territorial 
dimension; that is, the separation of spheres is not a merely 
conceptual or temporal divide but an actual, physical separation. 
Both the market/family distinction in the private realm and the 
state/local distinction in the public realm exhibit this territorial 
separation. As we will see, the spatial component of these distinctions 
plays a powerful role in legitimizing the liberal separation of spheres. 
This Section deals with the territorial division within the private 
realm of civil society; the following Section addresses the public 
realm of the state. 
During the late nineteenth century, under the pressure of an 
industrializing economy, work began migrating from the home to 
factories in urban centers.72 The market became physically separated 
 
 71.  Id. at 1506. 
 72.  See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization 
and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1245–51 (2008); 
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from the family. Having already rationalized the conceptual 
separation of the market and the family, liberalism now provided an 
elaborate justificatory scheme for the physical separation of home 
and work under industrial capitalism, the “separate spheres” 
ideology.73 The separate spheres ideology rationalized the geographic 
separation between home and work then occurring by stressing that 
home and work were two philosophically opposed realms—the 
former a sanctuary for familial solidarity and the latter a crucible of 
cutthroat competition—and that the unique characteristics of each 
realm could only be preserved if it were rigidly segregated from the 
other.74 The home was idealized as a refuge from work, where 
relations were governed not by the hostile whims of the marketplace 
but by the “rule of love.”75 Developers marketed homes in suburban 
subdivisions as ideal retreats from the commercial world of the city.76 
Likewise, though less often stated explicitly, it was perceived that the 
marketplace would benefit by being segregated from the family, 
enabling it to hone the pecuniary values of “[r]ationality, discipline, 
and a focus on objective reality” absent in the sphere of the home.77 
The state has played an active role in enforcing the separate 
spheres ideology. Just as the state enforces the liberal division 
between working time and family time through working-hours and 
child-labor laws, it likewise polices the distinction between family 
places and working places through single-use zoning laws that 
mandate the segregation of residential from commercial and 
industrial spaces. Single-use zoning laws emerged in the early 
twentieth century, just as the separate spheres ideology reached 
 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1199–201 (2001); Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property 
Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate Over Zoning for 
Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 416 (1994). 
 73.  As I discuss infra Part II, there is a close relationship between liberalism and 
capitalism. It is therefore not surprising that liberalism would provide an ideological 
justification for a pattern created by the rise of capitalism. 
 74.  See Stahl, supra note 72 (describing the changing nature of economy and rise of 
separate spheres ideology); Garnett, supra note 72 (same); Lees, supra note 72, at 415–
20 (same). 
 75.  See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2142–50 (1996). 
 76.  Garnett, supra note 72, at 1201–03. 
 77.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1500. 
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maturity. And the courts, who were especially invested in the liberal 
commitment to boundary maintenance, affirmed these zoning laws 
using rhetoric that was clearly suffused with the separate spheres 
ideology. For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a suburban zoning ordinance creating districts 
designated for single-family residences by reasoning: “The home 
seeker shuns a section of the city devoted to industrialism, and seeks 
a home at some distance from the business center. A common and 
natural instinct directs him to a section far removed from the 
commerce, trade, and industry of the community.”78 The New York 
Court of Appeals, in a similar vein, stated that “[t]he primary 
purpose of such a [single family residential] district is safe, healthful, 
and comfortable family life rather than the development of 
commercial instincts and the pursuit of pecuniary profits.”79 Though 
the rhetoric today is often less florid, single-use zoning remains 
predominant throughout the nation, and courts are highly 
deferential toward local zoning practices.80 
The spatial separation of spheres is a critical tool of classical 
judicial reasoning because it aids the judicial effort to remove politics 
from law and create an objective science of jurisprudence. The 
physical segregation of the family from the market, like the 
conceptual separation described by Olsen, is a “structure of 
consciousness;” that is, the organization of space is understood to be 
natural and authentic, and therefore requires no critical analysis by 
courts or other observers. As Richard Ford states: 
Doctrine and policy often assume both that particular political 
aspects of a spatial entity are the inherent property or immediate 
consequences of the space that defines the entity and are therefore 
 
 78.  State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (Wis. 1923). 
 79.  Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120, 123 (N.Y. 1925). As this rhetoric indicates, the 
spheres of the market and the family were not considered morally equivalent: the sphere of the 
family was thought to be morally superior to the market. In Part II, however, I explain that the 
rhetorical elevation of the family over the marketplace actually disguises the ways in which the 
family functions to support the marketplace by neutralizing resistance to the increasing 
exploitation taking place there under industrial capitalism. See Olsen, supra note 57, at 1524 
(“The family offered men an altruistic motive and justification for carrying on their 
individualistic struggles in the marketplace. It also offered men compensation for their 
suffering in the debasing world and thus reduced resistance to the increasing dehumanization 
of the market.” (footnote omitted)). 
 80.  See infra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
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beyond dispute, and also that the shape and location of the spatial 
entity are of no real consequence and therefore need not be 
examined or justified.81 
Here, the physical separation between the market and the family 
assumes the character of something “inherent” and “beyond 
dispute.” For instance, both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the 
New York Court of Appeals quoted above make reference to the 
“instincts” that draw people toward particular spheres. This rhetoric 
suggests that the separation of spheres is something primordial that 
resists rational analysis. As the geographer Henri Lefebvre writes, 
under liberalism “[t]he family, the school, the workplace, the church, 
and so on—each possesses an ‘appropriate’ space. . . . In these 
spaces, a system of ‘adapted’ expectations and responses—rarely 
articulated as such because they seem obvious—acquire a quasi-
natural self-evidence in everyday life and common sense.”82 The 
judiciary is able to avoid making out a normative case for the spatial 
separation of the market and the family because that case is “self-
evident” within the spaces themselves. 
3. Liberalism in space (the state): Dual federalism 
At around the same time the separate spheres ideology emerged, 
demanding the physical division of civil society into distinct realms 
for the market and the family, a new judicial doctrine also appeared 
that mandated the subdivision of the state into impregnable, quasi-
territorial spheres: federal, state, and local. The doctrine of “dual 
federalism,” much like the separate spheres ideology, used territory 
as a means of providing an objective, scientific determination as to 
the appropriate scope of governmental power. As we shall see in the 
next Section, the “appropriate scope of governmental power” 
specifically meant the degree of state interference that courts would 
permit into the spheres of the market and the family. In other words, 
the division of power among federal, state and local authorities was 
designed to maintain the liberal boundary between the state and civil 
 
 81.  Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1859–60 (1994). 
 82.  See HENRI LEFEBVRE, Space and the State, in STATE, SPACE, WORLD 223, 225 (Neil 
Brenner & Stuart Elden eds., Gerald Moore et al. trans., 2009). 
04.STAHL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  9:00 PM 
177 Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization 
 201 
society, just as the separate spheres ideology was designed to 
maintain the boundary between the market and the family. 
a. The Commerce Clause and the National/Local Distinction. If 
under liberalism there is a designated space for the market and a 
space for the family, there is also a space for the state. The modern 
nation-state is an archetypal example of a territorial sovereign, 
meaning that it has “exclusive authority over a given territory and at 
the same time this territory is constructed as coterminous with that 
authority.”83 Sovereignty thus extends to everything within the 
nation-state’s territory and nothing outside of it. 
During the late nineteenth century, the principle of territorial 
sovereignty that had effectively resolved the division of power as 
among competing nation-states evolved to take on a new task: the 
division of power among the various authorities within the individual 
nation-state. The conception that became known as dual federalism84 
postulated, according to Duncan Kennedy, “that there is an essential 
similarity between the territorial line dividing conventional 
sovereigns and the non-material line dividing state and federal 
jurisdictions.”85 Under dual federalism, federal and state 
governments exist within “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally 
limiting fields of power.”86 As with conventional nation-states, each 
government has absolute power vis-à-vis other authorities within its 
respective “field of power,” but is impotent outside that field 
of power. 
Furthermore, like conventional nation-states, under dual 
federalism power is divided between state and federal authorities 
 
 83.  SASSEN, supra note 22, at 6. 
 84.  Ernest Young distinguishes dual federalism from the related concept of dual 
sovereignty, noting that the latter divides sovereignty without necessarily requiring distinct 
spheres for each sovereign, whereas the former is predicated on the existence of distinct 
spheres. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign 
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 143–44 (2001). 
 85.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 33–
34 (2006). 
 86.  See Young, supra note 84, at 143 (quoting Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the 
Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie Earle 
ed., 1968)) (“‘Dual federalism’ means ‘two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of 
power—that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each 
other as equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions.’”). 
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using a principle of territoriality. Though there is no formal 
territorial boundary separating state and federal governments as 
there is between nation-states, the scope of each government’s 
authority under dual federalism is determined based on its territorial 
reach. For example, it was widely accepted in the nineteenth century 
that per the Commerce Clause and its implicit corollary, the 
“dormant” Commerce Clause, the federal government had the 
exclusive authority to regulate commerce deemed “interstate” in 
nature, while states had the exclusive authority to regulate commerce 
deemed to be purely “intrastate.”87 A major factor in determining 
whether a matter was interstate or intrastate was the need for 
nationwide uniformity in regulating the matter.88 The goal, 
according to Ernest Young, was to categorically distinguish matters 
of “national” concern from matters of “local” or state concern.89 As 
we recall, the judicial ideology of the day required a decisive and 
objectively ascertainable boundary line between the various 
institutions within the legal system. Under dual federalism, as under 
the separate spheres ideology, territory provided just such an 
objective basis for distinguishing state from national spheres of 
competence. As Kennedy notes, “[w]ithin the system of [dual 
federalism], the role of the federal judiciary was that of umpire and 
line drawer.”90 
It is hotly debated today whether Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence remains under the influence of dual federalism.91 I 
address this point further in Part II, but for the present it is of little 
moment because dual federalism undoubtedly still survives in the 
doctrine of home rule. 
 
 87.  Id. at 146. 
 88.  See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Young, supra note 
84, at 147. 
 89.  See Young, supra note 84, at 147. 
 90.  See KENNEDY, supra note 85, at 39. 
 91.  Many scholars argue that the Supreme Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence 
constitutes a return to the earlier era of “dual federalism.” See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual 
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998). Others, including Ernest Young, argue 
that the “new federalism” is distinct from dual federalism because there is a widespread judicial 
recognition of concurrent state and federal spheres of authority, and the courts give the federal 
government substantial latitude in exercising the commerce power. See, e.g., Young, supra note 
84, at 150–63. 
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b. Imperio Home Rule and the State/Local Distinction. Apparently 
inspired by the idea of dual federalism, progressive urban reformers 
during the early twentieth century sought to create a form of “home 
rule” for cities that would divide power between state and local 
governments in exactly the same way that dual federalism divided 
power between the federal and state governments.92 The reformers 
were deeply concerned about what they saw as excessive meddling by 
corrupt state legislators into the affairs of urban government, and 
they attributed this state of affairs in part to a crabbed judicial 
doctrine, known as Dillon’s Rule, under which local governments 
had only the powers expressly delegated to them by states.93 The 
reformers envisioned local government as an imperium in imperio, or 
a “state within a state,” and they successfully pushed to give local 
governments what became known as “imperio” home rule, which 
conferred upon local governments the independent authority to 
initiate legislation without an express delegation from the state, as 
well as immunity against state interference into local prerogatives.94 
The Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the day, which categorically 
distinguished between “national” and “local” (the latter confusingly 
meaning “state”) spheres of competence, provided an obvious 
precedent. Accordingly, imperio home rule provides that states and 
local governments have distinct and mutually exclusive spheres of 
activity, determined in a quasi-territorial fashion: local governments 
may only regulate in matters of “local” or “municipal” concern, and 
 
 92.  See, e.g., DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE 
HANDBOOK 12 (2001) (noting that early home rule reforms were consistent with 
dual federalism). 
 93.  See, e.g., id. at 10–11; Barron, supra note 14, at 2285–88. 
 94.  See KRANE ET AL., supra note 92, at 11–12. The idea of a “state within a state” 
makes a curious contrast with the Russian anarchist Petr Kropotkin’s idea of liberalism. In his 
view, “[t]he State, by its very essence, cannot tolerate free federation because the latter 
represents that nightmare of the legist: ‘The State within the State.’ The State . . . only deals 
with subjects.” Petr Kropotkin, THE STATE: ITS HISTORIC ROLE 31 (1946), quoted in 
NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 38–39 (1994); see 
also Frug, supra note 56 (arguing that the liberal state requires suppression of intermediate 
entities such as local governments). David Barron has shown, however, that liberalism does not 
necessarily demand the obliteration of the local but can deploy the local as a means of 
preserving the line between the public and the private, citing home rule as an example. See 
Barron, supra note 14, at 2296 n.142 (noting that according to home rule advocates, “the 
law’s special recognition of cities as important intermediate entities could be used to defend the 
sharp boundary between public and private”). 
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the state can only legislate in matters of greater than local concern, 
often called “statewide” matters.95 
Because imperio home-rule provisions rarely specified what 
powers were “local” or “municipal,” an important role was 
necessarily left for the courts in defining the meaning of these terms. 
Like the national/local distinction in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, courts have often determined whether a matter is 
local or statewide based on the need for statewide uniformity in 
regulation of a particular matter, as well as the extent to which local 
regulation has significant extraterritorial impacts.96 Consistent with 
dual federalism, furthermore, the notion that there is a clear quasi-
territorial boundary between state and local spheres of authority 
enables the judiciary to act as a neutral arbiter of the boundaries 
between spheres. Though there is some question as to the current 
status of dual federalism in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it 
remains alive and well in home-rule doctrine. As we have seen, the 
factors of uniformity and extraterritoriality are often decisive in 
modern home-rule cases, such as American Financial Services.97 
There is a clear conceptual link between the division of power 
within the state under imperio home rule (state/local) and the 
 
 95.  See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1341, 1349−55. Though Baker and 
Rodriguez make reference to a third sphere of “mixed” state/local concern, the idea of the 
mixed sphere has so far only been recognized in Colorado and even there, as I discuss further 
infra note 135, the “mixed” analysis largely replicates the statewide/local dichotomy prevalent 
in other imperio states. 
 96.  See id. (“[T]he two factors that seem to loom largest [in judicial determinations of 
whether a power is statewide or local are] the extraterritorial effects of the local regulation, and 
the need for statewide uniformity in the relevant regulatory area.”); Reynolds, supra note 16. 
One of the major difficulties in drawing the line between statewide and local functions, of 
course, is that virtually all local government activities have extraterritorial impacts, and there 
are always arguments in favor of and against the need for statewide uniformity in any particular 
case. The early home-rule reformers were apparently untroubled by this, as they seemed to 
think that the simple act of drawing a firm line between state and local was more important 
than where the line was actually drawn. See Barron, supra note 14, at 2306 (describing home-
rule advocate Frank Goodnow’s description of home rule as “a hazy depiction of the precise 
powers that would fall within the ‘local’ sphere—a depiction that seemed to range from 
virtually all to virtually none”). As I address at the end of this Part, courts have attempted to 
resolve this difficulty largely by focusing on the subject matter at issue. This has not solved the 
problem, however, because courts have had equal difficulty distinguishing between different 
subject matters. 
 97.  See generally Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8 (discussing cases in which uniformity 
and/or extraterritoriality have been decisive); Reynolds, supra note 16 (same). 
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separation of spheres within civil society (market/family). In 
accordance with liberal ideology, each institution has its own distinct, 
territorially demarcated sphere that, at least in principle, does not 
overlap with the other spheres. The idea that each sphere is exclusive 
within a designated territorial envelope gives the separation of 
spheres a veneer of naturalness and authenticity that enables the 
judiciary to characterize the adjudicative process as an objective 
science of boundary maintenance. 
But there is more. As I argue in the next Section, the 
statewide/local dichotomy under imperio home rule is actually 
designed to maintain the parallel market/family distinction, as well 
as the broader distinction between the state and civil society. To put 
it another way, power is divided territorially between the state and 
the local in order to keep the state, the market, and the family within 
their respective spheres. This is accomplished primarily by assigning 
regulation of the marketplace to the state and regulation of the 
family to the local sphere. 
C. The State/Local Distinction Meets the Market/Family Distinction 
1. The state and the market 
I begin with the proposition that, under imperio home rule, the 
state is considered the appropriate sphere for regulating the market. 
Undoubtedly, one underlying purpose of the scalar division of state 
power is to limit government regulation of commercial activity—that 
is, to keep the state from invading the sphere of the marketplace. As 
we have already seen, the concept of dual federalism at the 
state/national level was primarily implemented within the field of 
commercial regulation. The Commerce Clause under dual federalism 
simultaneously prohibited the federal government from regulating 
purely intrastate commerce and the states from regulating interstate 
commerce, thus cabining the ability of both authorities to regulate 
the marketplace. As Barry Cushman writes, the national/local 
distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence tracked the wider 
liberal distinction then being drawn between the public and private 
spheres and was used for the same purpose—to prevent government 
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from regulating the “private” affairs of the commercial realm.98 It is 
not a coincidence that dual federalism reached its apogee during the 
Lochner era, when judicial doctrine was infused with a highly 
libertarian strain.99 We have already seen that one reason the 
judiciary was so invested in the liberal ideology of separate spheres, 
which likewise emerged in the Lochner era, was to keep the state 
from redistributing wealth.100 Maintaining separate spheres for the 
state and the market was a way of keeping the state from excessive 
interference with private property and commercial activity. 
Imperio home rule, likewise, was intended as a mechanism for 
maintaining the boundary between the market and the state via the 
scalar subdivision of state authority. David Barron has argued that 
one original goal of the home-rule movement was to protect 
business from meddling by the political machines that controlled 
state and city governments during the Gilded Age. Gilded Age cities 
engaged in “unprecedented levels of taxing and spending,” 
redistributing wealth in favor of special interests.101 In other words, 
these cities did not respect the boundary between the state and the 
market. What Barron calls the “old conservative” model of home 
rule was designed to secure a “self-regulating, competitive market 
economy presided over by a neutral, impartial[,] and decentralized 
‘night-watchman’ state,”102 and specifically “to maintain separation 
between the market and the government”103 by prohibiting local 
governments from profligate taxing and spending. In a similar vein, 
Richard Schragger argues that local government law doctrines such 
 
 98.  See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1127–29 (2000). 
 99.  See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888−1910, 
8 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 45–49, 155–84 (1993) (Stanley N. Katz ed.) (on the ideology of 
the Lochner era). 
 100.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 101.  See Barron, supra note 14, at 2293. 
 102.  Id. at 2292–93 (quoting Daniel R. Ernst, Critical Tradition in the Writing of 
American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1037 (1993) (book review)); MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 4 (1992) (defining 
“old conservatism”). 
 103.  Barron, supra note 14, at 2316. Barron describes the “old conservative” idea as 
one of three popular ideological frameworks used to justify home rule during the early 
twentieth century, along with the “administrative” city model and the “social” city model. 
See id. at 2291–321. 
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as home rule were efforts to “defin[e] the appropriate spheres for 
government and business,” and that these efforts were “consistent 
with classical legal thought generally, which sought to police the line 
between private and public by limiting legislative interference in the 
market.”104 Limiting city authority over the market was, in short, a 
way of preserving the boundary between government and 
the market. 
Initially, as Barron observes, the home-rule reformers were just 
as skeptical of state government as they were of local government, if 
not more so, and they saw home rule as a means of preventing state 
interference in local affairs.105 But as states and local governments 
became more assertive in regulating commerce, the courts drew 
upon the obvious comparison between the Commerce Clause and 
home rule and began to find that, just as the Commerce Clause 
prevented states from interfering with national economic objectives, 
home rule prohibited local governments from interfering with 
statewide commerce. In an important 1964 article on home rule, 
Terrance Sandalow argued that the amorphous doctrine prohibiting 
local governments from exercising the home-rule initiative power so 
as to cause extraterritorial impacts was analogous to the dormant 
Commerce Clause’s limitation on state regulation of interstate 
commerce.106 Sandalow pointed out that while courts had placed 
very few limits on the municipal use of the home-rule initiative 
power, one area in which courts had prevented local governments 
from exercising the initiative was in cases where the municipality had 
“obstruct[ed] the flow of commerce within the state.”107 
 
 104.  See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 498 (2009). According to this classical legal view, 
Schragger argues, “the city’s powers had to be read narrowly to ensure that the city regulated 
in the public interest and operated as a neutral framework for private economic activity.” Id. at 
500. Though the quoted passage pertains specifically to Dillon’s Rule, Schragger sees Dillon’s 
Rule and home rule as stemming from similar ideological impulses to restrain cities from 
excessive involvement in the private market. See id. at 500–02; see also Barron, supra note 14, 
at 2294 (arguing that “old conservative” home rule reformers shared with Dillon the goal of 
circumscribing local power). 
 105.  See Barron, supra note 14, at 2286–96; see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 92, at  10–11. 
 106.  See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role 
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 702–03 (1964). 
 107.  See id. at 703–04 (citing Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 122 P.2d 965 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1942); citing City of Arlington v. Lillard, 294 S.W. 829 (Tex. 1927)). 
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Sandalow argued that courts were correct to hold that 
commercial regulation was a statewide rather than a local matter 
because, given the large number of local governments in any state, 
local regulation of commercial activity would risk “balkanizing” the 
state’s economy into a multitude of small fiefdoms.108 Sandalow also 
argued, echoing James Madison’s famous Federalist No. 10,109 that 
local home-rule power should be narrowly construed because local 
governments are, by virtue of their relatively smaller size, far more 
likely than states to be captured by special interests who can exploit 
vulnerable minorities for their own benefit.110 The argument was 
reminiscent of the “old conservative” home-rule reformers, who 
expressed concern about local governments redistributing wealth to 
favored interests. Such favoritism made local governments incapable 
of being what Rich Schragger has called the “neutral framework for 
private economic activity” that liberal ideology requires the state to 
be.111 Maintaining the boundary between the market and the 
government thus required that economic affairs be vested at the level 
of the state. 
Sandalow’s observations proved prescient. Ever since, as we have 
seen, one clear thrust within imperio home-rule doctrine is for 
courts to consider efforts to regulate commerce—banking 
regulation, predatory lending, wage controls, rent control—as 
statewide rather than local in nature, due primarily to the need for 
statewide uniformity and the extraterritorial impacts of local 
commercial regulation.112 And the Madisonian critique of local 
 
 108.  See Sandalow, supra note 106, at 704. 
 109.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(arguing that smaller jurisdictions are more likely than larger ones to enable oppressive 
“factions” to unfairly exploit minorities). 
 110.  See Sandalow, supra note 106, at 710–21. 
 111.  Schragger, supra note 104, at 500. 
 112.  See supra notes 10−13 (collecting cases). Considering the link between home rule 
and the dormant Commerce Clause, it is noteworthy that courts today still use the dormant 
Commerce Clause, in an analogous fashion to home rule, to strike down laws that interfere 
with interstate commerce in the course of effectuating local interests. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot 
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (striking down a state 
law prohibiting counties from accepting solid waste from outside the county as a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause). 
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governments as especially vulnerable to special-interest capture has 
become a standard trope in the literature on local government.113 
2. The local and the family 
If imperio home rule helps to maintain the boundary between 
the state and the market by conceptualizing commercial regulation 
as statewide in nature, it maintains the boundary between the state 
and the family, and between the market and the family, in exactly the 
opposite way: by conceptualizing matters relating to home and 
family as local rather than statewide in nature (thus providing a literal 
meaning to the term “home” rule). Earlier I discussed the “separate 
spheres” ideology, which posited that the home and market should 
be physically as well as conceptually separated in order to preserve 
the market as a realm for competitive self-seeking and the home as a 
refuge from the marketplace. The separate spheres ideology was 
essentially codified in single-use zoning ordinances, which courts 
enthusiastically endorsed, that required the geographical separation 
of residential from commercial and industrial uses.114 Most often, 
these zoning laws had the express purpose of protecting single-family 
residential districts from “invasion” by other uses, and the courts, in 
the course of upholding such laws, rationalized them as legitimate 
efforts to protect the home and family from the adverse influence of 
the marketplace.115 
The connection that early zoning advocates and courts drew 
between zoning and the protection of the home and family made it 
inevitable that land-use regulation would come to be apprehended as 
a peculiarly local power. Since de Tocqueville, the local has been 
perceived as having a certain closeness to the home and family that 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 104 at 491–98 (explaining that cities are likely to 
exploit immobile capital and be exploited by mobile capital); Carol M. Rose, Planning and 
Dealing: Piecemeal Land Use Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 
853–57 (1983) (observing that local governments are susceptible to special interest “capture” 
under Madison’s model). But see Gillette, supra note 4, at 1114–17 (challenging conventional 
wisdom and arguing that states may be more likely than local governments to be captured by 
special interests). 
 114.  See supra notes 77−80 and accompanying text. 
 115.  See supra notes 77−80 and accompanying text. 
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more remote levels of government lack.116 We have seen already that 
under dual federalism, courts interpreted interstate commerce as an 
inherently “national” function; at the same time, they also 
interpreted matters related to home and family as “local.” As Reva 
Siegel explains, it was widely held in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that the power to regulate the family was reserved 
for “local self-government.”117 Hence, the national/local distinction 
replicated the market/family distinction in civil society. 
Although in dual federalist lingo the term “local” was used 
interchangeably to mean state or local, perhaps reflecting the 
ambiguous place of local governments in our constitutional order, 
home-rule doctrine grafted the national/local dichotomy onto the 
state/local distinction; thus, just as commerce became a statewide 
function, the family came to be perceived as local in the literal sense 
(although we will have occasion to see some lingering ambiguity 
about the regulation of the family in Part II). According to Richard 
Briffault, courts consider “[t]he central function of local 
government” to be the protection of “the home and family—
enabling residents to raise their children in ‘decent’ surroundings, 
servicing home and family needs and insulating home and family 
from undesirable changes in the surrounding area.”118 Indeed, the 
connection between the family and the local is so strong that, where 
local governments act in matters that are perceived as affecting home 
and family, such as land-use regulation and school control, courts 
often conceptualize local governments as organic outgrowths of the 
 
 116.  See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53–54 (Sanford Kessler 
ed., Stephen D. Grant trans., 2000) (1835) (“It is in the township, at the center of the 
ordinary relations of life, that are concentrated the desire for esteem, the need born of real 
interests, the taste for power and éclat; these passions, which so often disturb society, change 
character when they can be thus exercised close to hearth and home and in a way in the bosom 
of the family.” (footnote omitted)). 
 117.  See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 997–1003 (2002). While Siegel interprets 
the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment as a rebuke to the “local self-government” 
argument, she also views the Supreme Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence as reprising 
that conception. See id. at 951–52, 1028–29, 1030–38. I discuss the new federalism 
jurisprudence infra notes 155−157 and accompanying text. 
 118.  See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 382 (1990). 
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family, extensions of the “private” sphere, not coercive 
governmental entities.119 
A well-known example is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,120 wherein the Court upheld a zoning 
ordinance limiting a community to single-family residences. The 
Court reasoned that a locality’s police power “is ample to lay out 
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”121 
According to Briffault, the Court perceived Belle Terre as “an 
extension of the home, not an arm of the state, a defender of the 
family rather than an oppressor of individual liberty.”122 In short, 
assigning family matters to the sphere of the local preserves the 
boundary between the family and the market by empowering local 
governments (through zoning laws) to protect the family from the 
market, and also preserves the boundary between the state and the 
family by keeping the coercive regulatory state at arm’s length from 
the local sphere of the family.123 
As a result, in contrast to their stance on economic matters, 
courts broadly defer to local governments in matters involving land 
use and school control, and in doing so, as in Belle Terre, they often 
equate local control of such matters with the protection of home and 
family.124 Furthermore, consistent with the imperio conception of 
 
 119.  See Ford, supra note 81, at 1880–81 (explaining that courts cede local governments 
autonomy when they “understand the controversy in question to be analogous to the property 
or associational rights of individuals”). 
 120.  416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 121.  Id. at 9. 
 122.  Briffault, supra note 118, at 383. 
 123.  In light of my argument that imperio home rule assigns matters related to home 
and family to the sphere of the local, it is curious that under the aforementioned “private law” 
exception to home rule, see supra note 13, local governments have no authority to create 
family law. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 153−55 (2005). Rather, as I explain in the next Part, local 
governments have the apparently exclusive authority to defend the normative conception of the 
family that the state defines through family law. In Part II, I will argue that this apparent 
inconsistency is actually a feature of liberalism because it uses the rhetoric that the local is the 
sphere of the family to conceal the state’s hegemony over family matters. See infra notes 
243−69 and accompanying text. Infra note 125, I discuss at greater length the apparent 
inconsistency between the rhetoric of local control over land use and the reality of 
state control. 
 124.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973) 
(upholding a school financing scheme based on local property tax revenues despite severe 
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home rule, courts have, at least on occasion, immunized local 
governments against state legislative or federal judicial interference in 
matters affecting the home and family.125 
 
interlocal inequalities in tax base on the grounds that “local control means . . . the freedom to 
devote more money to the education of one’s children”). 
 125.  See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 480–82 (1982) 
(invalidating a statewide initiative prohibiting local school districts from using race-based 
school assignment plans on grounds of respect for long-standing tradition of local control over 
public education); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that federal district court 
lacked equitable power to order interdistrict school bussing as remedy for racial segregation in 
area schools due to tradition of local control of public schools); Town of Telluride v. San 
Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008) (en banc) (invalidating a state statute 
attempting to prohibit local government’s extraterritorial exercise of eminent domain power as 
unconstitutional interference with local government home rule authority); Baker & Rodriguez, 
supra note 8, at 1357–60 (observing that “[l]ocal zoning power is generally upheld against 
state intervention” in part because “the core idea of local control over land use has become a 
deeply embedded norm”); id. at 1359 (“[T]he states are quite limited in their ability to 
displace local regulations dealing with land.”). 
It is true that, these cases notwithstanding, local governments generally exercise the 
land use power as delegates of the state, and the state can therefore dictate the terms on which 
local governments exercise that power. For instance, as David Barron mentions, background 
state laws, such as the requirement that localities finance services primarily from the local 
property tax, affect local government incentives in exercising the land use power. See Barron, 
supra note 14, at 2378−79. Notwithstanding the strong degree of state involvement in this 
area, however, my point here is that the courts rhetorically treat land use as a peculiarly local 
power. In Rodriguez, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a scheme of financing schools 
through local property taxes that was imposed by the state on the grounds that “local control 
means . . . the freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s children.” 411 U.S. at 
49–50. 
As I explain further in Part II, this is not empty rhetoric. First, the notion of local 
control has, on occasion, caused courts to vindicate local control even against the state itself, as 
in Washington. 458 U.S. at 480–82 (invalidating a statewide initiative prohibiting local school 
districts from using race-based school assignment plans on grounds of respect for long-
standing tradition of local control over public education). Second, the idea that land use is a 
peculiarly local function has the paradoxical effect of strengthening and disguising state control 
over land use. Joan Williams argues that the Court’s rhetorical move in cases like Rodriguez 
was necessary because, in the aftermath of the Court’s Civil Rights-era jurisprudence holding 
that the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states, state laws could only be immunized 
against Fourteenth Amendment challenges if characterized as local rather than state laws. See 
Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics 
of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 106−15. Williams analogizes this 
rhetorical move to classical jurists’ efforts to create a “theory of powers absolute within their 
spheres,” in which the judge’s “task . . . is to make technical, legal judgments, not political 
ones.” Id. at 115-16. Thus, the liberal separation of spheres legitimizes state regulation in areas 
such as land use and school control by disguising it with a sentimental rhetoric of local control. 
This is a key component of my thesis that the liberal separation of spheres is an illusion that 
obfuscates the dominance of the state and capital over the local. See infra notes 243−69 and 
accompanying text. 
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3. Uniformity and extraterritoriality 
Interestingly, as we have already seen in the DeVita case, when 
local governments enact policies that affect land use or public 
schools, the concerns about uniformity and extraterritoriality that 
were so important in cases involving commerce simply disappear. In 
some cases, indeed, the courts deny that local land-use and school 
policies even have any extraterritorial impacts.126 In fact, however, 
because local land-use authority is often fragmented across dozens of 
municipalities within a single metropolitan area, local regulations 
involving land use and schools can have substantial extraterritorial 
impacts and cause significant statewide problems, such as poor 
regional land-use and transportation planning, shortages of 
regionally necessary but locally undesirable land uses, wide interlocal 
disparities in taxable resources and school quality, and the like.127 
Though courts rarely articulate why uniformity and 
extraterritoriality are so important in cases involving commerce, only 
to vanish in cases dealing with the home and family, the discussion 
up to this point gives us some reason to speculate. Under the 
separate spheres ideology, as we have already seen, market and family 
are constructed as philosophically opposed spaces—the former the 
realm of competitive self-seeking, the latter the realm of love. This 
crudely drawn contrast enabled liberal jurists to draw a broader 
distinction: they conceptualized the market as “universal,” as having 
uniform application everywhere, whereas they conceptualized the 
family as “particular,” adapted to the unique circumstances of 
individual places.128 All market transactions are fundamentally the 
same insofar as they are all arm’s-length transactions between self-
 
 126.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975) (denying standing to challenge 
exclusionary zoning ordinance to taxpayers in neighboring community on grounds that zoning 
ordinance had no impact on tax rates in adjacent town); Milliken, 418 U.S. at 739−47 
(holding that district court lacked equitable powers to order interdistrict bussing as remedy for 
segregated school system in Detroit area because neighboring suburbs had no responsibility for 
the predominantly black population of the Detroit school system). 
 127.  See Briffault, supra note 18, at 1132–41 (describing some of these implications). 
 128.  See Janet Halley, After Gender: Tools for Progressives in a Shift from Sexual 
Domination to the Economic Family, 31 PACE L. REV. 887, 895−97 (2011); Janet Halley & 
Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary 
Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756–58 (2010); cf. DOREEN 
MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, AND GENDER 9–11 (1994) (explaining that, in Western thought, the 
universal is coded as masculine and the local as feminine). 
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interested individuals, but the family is governed by a spirit of 
altruism and affection that emerges organically from the particular 
local culture—hence, courts freely apply the universal law of 
contracts to all commercial transactions on the theory that contracts 
are simply impersonal transactions between juridical equals, whereas 
they decline to enforce contracts between family members because 
such contracts could threaten the ethos of altruism within the 
family.129 The idea of the market as universal would explain why 
courts focus on extraterritoriality and uniformity when they perceive 
a matter as affecting the market, whereas the idea of the family as 
particular would explain why those factors become immaterial when 
courts perceive a matter as implicating the family. Because the market 
is universal, all commercial transactions must be governed by a 
uniform set of rules, but since families are produced by particularized 
local cultures, there is no uniform body of family law.130 
The imagined dichotomy between the universal market and the 
particular family reinforces the classical judicial effort to construct an 
objective science of jurisprudence. By virtue of the separate spheres 
 
 129.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. As Halley and Rittich point out, the 
universal/particular dichotomy can also be reversed, with the market being perceived as 
particular insofar as “[e]very [c]ontract is [u]nique,” and the family as universal insofar as “it is 
[f]undamental [e]verywhere.” See Halley, supra note 128, at 895−97; Halley & Rittich, supra 
note 128, at 756–58. As I discuss infra notes 215−17, 243−69 and accompanying text, home 
rule disguises the ways in which the family is universal (i.e., controlled by the state) by 
assigning family matters to the “particular” sphere of the local, and home rule also disguises 
that ways in which the market is particular by creating the appearance that capital has uniform 
impacts everywhere. 
 130.  An alternative explanation for the commerce/land use distinction in home-rule 
doctrine is suggested by economic analysis. According to David Schleicher’s provocative 
theory, the division of power between state and local governments under home rule can be 
seen as resting on a distinction between “agglomerative efficiency” and “sorting efficiency.” 
See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507. The 
state reserves to itself the power to regulate matters that have substantial spillover effects 
(hence the focus on extraterritoriality) while delegating to local governments control over 
matters, such as zoning and school control, that enable members of the population to “vote 
with their feet” and choose a municipality in which to settle. See id. at 1555–62. On closer 
inspection, Schleicher’s agglomeration/sorting dichotomy appears to be a structure of 
consciousness much like the market/family distinction. Zoning and school control, no less 
than financial regulation, have substantial spillover impacts that would seemingly call for 
agglomeration (i.e., a regional land use authority), but as I have noted, courts typically ignore 
those spillovers because of a pre-commitment to local control of family matters. Conversely, a 
municipality’s decision to protect the local public from predatory lending could be seen as a 
sorting mechanism intended to lure prospective residents who desire that protection. 
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ideology, the universal/particular distinction becomes a structure of 
consciousness that acquires what Lefebvre called “a quasi-natural 
self-evidence in everyday life and common sense.”131 As such, the 
judiciary need not justify the boundary between the family and the 
market but merely identify it. As applied to home rule, once the 
court labels a matter as “commercial,” that is sufficient to evoke the 
whole set of cultural considerations bound up with the universal 
market, including a focus on uniformity and extraterritoriality.132 
Conversely, when a matter is identified as land use, that calls up the 
cultural understandings associated with the idea of the particular 
family, specifically the need for local diversity. A passing reference to 
“traditional” notions of state and local powers is all that is necessary 
to explain the division between the spheres. Of course, this 
observation begs the question that the next Part will answer: what if 
the market and the family are not as clearly distinguishable as this 
judicial construction makes them appear? 
To sum up the argument so far, the separation of state and local 
authority via imperio home rule is also a mechanism for keeping the 
family, the market, and the state within their designated territorial 
spheres. Imperio home rule assigns commercial regulation to the 
sphere of the state and land-use regulation to the sphere of the local. 
Doing so creates a contrast between the market and the family in 
which the market can be seen as universal and the family as 
particular. As a result, courts strike down local commercial regulation 
as “statewide” based on its perceived extraterritorial impacts and 
effect on uniformity, while validating municipal land-use regulation 
and school control as “local” despite having similar impacts. The 
unspoken expectations attaching to each sphere and the apparent 
naturalness of the state/local and market/family distinctions cause 
this judicial line-drawing to appear objective and inexorable. 
 
 131.  See LEFEBVRE, supra note 82, at 225. 
 132.  See Kennedy, supra note 67, at 6 (defining “legal consciousness” to mean that 
judges “share premises about the salient aspects of the legal order that are so basic that actors 
rarely if ever bring them consciously to mind”). 
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D. A Test of the Theory: Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four 
Venture, L.L.C. 
If this summary is correct, it follows that the subject matter of 
any home-rule dispute will carry more weight in determining the 
outcome than the mechanical application of factors such as 
uniformity and extraterritoriality; indeed, the subject matter will 
determine whether those factors are even relevant.133 To the extent a 
matter is characterized as commercial, extraterritoriality and 
uniformity will be paramount considerations, and they will weigh in 
favor of statewide control; if the matter is characterized as land use, 
these factors will be less weighty, perhaps even immaterial, and the 
matter will likely be perceived as local. The problem that inevitably 
arises, as we will see, is that commerce and land use, like the market 
and the family, are not neatly divisible. 
Consider a test case, Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 
L.L.C.134 This case will demonstrate the significance of the land 
use/commerce distinction under imperio home rule but will also 
reveal that distinction to be untenable. In Telluride, the court 
considered whether a local affordable housing ordinance enacted by 
the ski resort town of Telluride, Colorado, which set maximum 
rental rates for new housing within the community, was preempted 
by a state law prohibiting local governments from enacting rent 
control. Under the imperio doctrine, the state law could not 
preempt Telluride’s ordinance if the ordinance dealt with a matter of 
local concern. The Colorado Supreme Court, though, found that 
the ordinance did not address a matter of local concern.135 The court 
 
 133.  See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1355 (suggesting that “regulatory 
categories explain some of the pattern of home rule decisions”). 
 134.  3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000). 
 135.  The court found that the ordinance addressed a matter of “mixed” local and 
statewide concern and therefore was preempted by a state law prohibiting “rent control.” See 
id. at 39. Colorado is the lone state I have discovered to recognize a “mixed” sphere of 
state/local authority. The existence of the mixed sphere may appear to mark a departure from 
the imperio model. But, as the text describes, the analysis the Colorado courts apply to 
determine whether a matter is of “mixed” local and statewide concern is the traditional 
imperio inquiry of whether local regulation has extraterritorial impacts and impedes statewide 
uniformity. Moreover, consistent with the imperio model, these factors become irrelevant once 
the matter is characterized as land-use regulation rather than economic regulation. 
The court’s finding that rent control was a matter of “mixed” concern would 
presumably mean that a municipality could enact rent control under its home-rule initiative 
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recited the familiar factors of uniformity and extraterritoriality, 
reasoning that statewide “[u]niformity in landlord-tenant relations” 
was a priority because it “fosters informed and realistic expectations 
by the parties to a lease”136 and that the ordinance had an 
impermissible extraterritorial impact because “[r]estricting the 
operation of the free market with respect to housing in one area may 
well cause housing investment and population to migrate to other 
communities already facing their own growth problems.”137 
What is striking about the court’s description is that it makes 
Telluride’s ordinance sound like a pretty typical example of the kind 
of land-use regulation that courts routinely find to be within the 
local sphere. We recall, for example, that the DeVita court upheld 
Napa County’s general plan amendment drastically limiting growth 
in the county, notwithstanding that the amendment would clearly, as 
Telluride put it, “cause housing investment and population to 
migrate to other communities already facing their own growth 
problems,” on the theory that land-use regulation is a traditional 
area of local concern.138 As we have just seen, courts generally 
consider land-use regulations to be local regardless of their effects on 
uniformity or their extraterritorial impact. Indeed, the principal 
Telluride dissent argued that even if the law had the impacts the 
majority claimed, it nevertheless fell within the scope of local control 
because it was “fundamentally a land use regulation.”139 
The fact that the Telluride court struck down the affordable 
housing ordinance might then suggest that the court was 
challenging the imperio model and holding—as the dissent in 
 
power in the absence of preemptive state legislation. That implication is a fairly meaningless 
one, however, because the Telluride court takes such a sweeping approach to preemption as to 
effectively disable local governments from acting within the mixed sphere. Specifically, as the 
principal dissent noted, the court characterized Telluride’s ordinance as rent control despite 
the fact that the state law regarding rent control was clearly not directed at ordinances such as 
Telluride’s. See id. at 40–44 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting). Under such a broad approach to 
preemption, finding a matter to be of “mixed” concern would effectively mean that the matter 
was statewide. Coincidentally, many courts in other states have held that local governments 
lack the home-rule initiatory power to enact rent control. See supra note 13. Hence, the 
“mixed” analysis simply replicates the imperio analysis in a different guise. 
 136.  See Telluride, 3 P.3d at 38. 
 137.  See id. at 39. 
 138.  See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Telluride, 3 P.3d at 45–46 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting). 
04.STAHL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  9:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
218 
DeVita would have—that land-use regulation is not purely local in 
nature because it has impermissible extraterritorial impacts. That is 
not, however, how the court characterized its holding. Instead, the 
court answered the dissent by holding that the law was not a land-
use regulation, which it acknowledged was traditionally a local 
matter, but rather an instance of “economic legislation.”140 By 
implication, if the ordinance were properly characterized as land-use 
regulation, Telluride would have the freedom to act even if it did 
cause substantial extraterritorial impacts. Indeed, in a subsequent 
case involving an effort by Telluride to assert the eminent domain 
power over territory outside its borders, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that Telluride could act extraterritorially, and that the 
state had no power to prevent Telluride from doing so, because 
Telluride was exercising the “local” prerogative of land-
use regulation.141 
Both the majority and the dissent in the first Telluride case were 
thus playing by the same set of imperio rules. To the extent the 
ordinance could be characterized as economic legislation, uniformity 
and extraterritorial impact were predominant concerns. But to the 
extent the ordinance was characterized as land-use regulation, those 
concerns evaporated. Both opinions implicitly agreed that the 
validity of the ordinance turned not on whether it had extraterritorial 
impacts or adversely affected uniformity but whether it could be 
characterized as commercial or land-use regulation. Both opinions 
are thus consistent with the liberal imperio model’s categorical 
separation of commercial regulation from land-use regulation, the 
market from the family. 
 
 140.  See id. at 39 n.9 (majority opinion). Although the court stated that “[t]he 
constitution does not assign the issue of rent control, or economic regulation generally, either 
to state or local regulation,” id. at 39, the combined effect of the court’s broad approach to 
preemption, as discussed supra note 135, and its relatively narrow conception of the local 
sphere, was to make rent control a statewide matter. 
 141.  See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008); 
Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 1359. For discussion of the Telluride cases, see, for 
example, id. at 1358–60; Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.: 
Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1311 (2009). In addition to 
Telluride, David Barron discusses a few other cases in which courts have struck down local 
affordable-housing measures as outside the scope of local home-rule authority. See Barron, 
supra note 14, at 2357–61. In at least two of these cases, as in Telluride, the courts 
characterized the affordable-housing law at issue as something other than a land-
use regulation. 
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At the same time, Telluride gives us reason to doubt the viability 
of the imperio model. As we have seen, the model presupposes that 
the various spheres could be neatly separated by a disinterested 
judiciary. Telluride makes clear, however, that the boundaries 
between the spheres are not readily ascertained. Was Telluride’s 
ordinance commercial regulation or land-use regulation? The court 
reasoned that the law was not a land-use regulation because it did 
not dictate the use of property.142 But many modern land-use laws—
such as subdivision regulations, growth controls, or concurrency 
requirements—similarly do not dictate permissible uses but are 
nevertheless municipal efforts to control how land is used.143 
Moreover, it is not clear that Telluride’s ordinance would have had 
the extraterritorial impacts the court described. As the dissent 
pointed out, Telluride’s affordable housing ordinance would not 
externalize the costs of housing restrictions to neighboring 
communities. To the contrary, Telluride enacted the ordinance in 
order to ensure that it absorbed the demand for low-income housing 
that it had itself created by approving new non-residential 
development.144 Rather than having any extra-local impact, 
Telluride’s law was designed to prevent any extraterritorial impact by 
internalizing the impacts of its own local decisions.145 
Telluride thus demonstrates how difficult it is to distinguish land-
use regulation from commercial regulation. In this respect, as we will 
see presently, Telluride is emblematic of our “postmodern” age of 
globalization, in which the boundaries between the global and the 
local, the market and the family, are increasingly blurred. Yet, 
Telluride also shows that courts remain married to a model of 
judicial review that requires the assignment of matters to fixed 
categories despite the stubborn resistance of human life to being 
categorized. The disconnect between the reality and the judicial 
“consciousness” has important consequences that the following Part 
now explores. 
 
 142.  See Telluride, 3 P.3d at 39 n.9. 
 143.  See id. at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting) (providing examples of land use 
regulations that do not dictate the permissible uses of property). 
 144.  See id. at 46–47. 
 145.  Id. 
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II. THE MARXIAN VIEW OF IMPERIO HOME RULE 
If it has been liberalism’s central ambition to erect clean 
boundaries between the various spheres of human activity, one 
signature characteristic of our “postmodern” global age is the 
evident unsustainability of those boundaries.146 Telluride, as we have 
just seen, demonstrates how the distinction between land-use 
regulation and commercial regulation, seemingly so firm in the 
liberal imagination, is actually quite fuzzy in practice. This 
observation indicates that the broader market/family distinction, 
which the commercial/land-use distinction replicates at the doctrinal 
level in imperio home rule, has itself become unstable. Indeed, as 
Janet Halley points out, rather than being distinct from the market, 
the family is an economic unit, deeply bound up with the 
marketplace in numerous ways. The family is a “crucial site of 
consumption” under capitalism, where individuals “pool income and 
labor resources in that they allocate work responsibilities and income 
streams among household members for the purposes of reproducing 
both existing and new humans, securing social security, and 
contextualizing and distributing the costs and benefits of 
consumption.”147 Moreover, the family cannot be distinguished from 
the marketplace as an affective realm where the “rule of love” 
predominates over self-interest because the family is, no less than the 
marketplace, a site of arm’s-length negotiation “in which conflicts of 
interest are just as likely as altruism, merger, and 
selfless cooperation.”148 
Likewise, the spatial boundary that liberalism sought to erect 
between the market and the family has also proven untenable, as 
modern technological developments and the shift from an industrial 
to a service- and information-based economy has enabled millions of 
Americans to work from home and also enabled millions of women 
to enter the workforce, undermining the sexual division of labor that 
 
 146.  See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY 
INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 3–9 (1989) (explaining that postmodernism 
recognizes and celebrates the fragmentary nature of social life, in contrast to the “modern” 
liberal effort to create a homogenous, unified social order); BLOMLEY, supra note 94, at 51 
(noting that “postmodern” legal scholarship denies asserted unity of liberal jurisprudence, 
“emphasizing instead the diversity of the micro-constituents of social life”). 
 147.  Halley, supra note 128, at 901. 
 148.  Halley & Rittich, supra note 128, at 760. 
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underlay the home/work dichotomy.149 In lockstep with these 
changes, urban design movements like the New Urbanism have 
challenged the predominant tradition of single-use zoning and 
sought to create mixed-use communities.150 In fact, urban form as a 
whole is becoming increasingly “ageographical,” an endless vista of 
mixed high- and low-density housing, commerce, and industry, 
linked together in a regionally interdependent economy in which 
work, residence, and recreation all occur across porous boundaries.151 
The ageographical nature of urban form confounds the liberal 
notion of a defined physical sphere within which municipalities are 
licensed to act. 
At the same time that the spatial boundary between home and 
work is being exposed as unsustainable, so is the quasi-territorial 
boundary dividing scalar levels of government, as well as the 
territorial boundary dividing different nation-states. Since the New 
Deal, the national government has increasingly asserted itself into 
areas once seen as statewide and local on the theory that any state or 
local action has extraterritorial impacts that affect national economic 
or cultural objectives; conversely, states frequently regulate matters 
that were once thought to fall within the national sphere of interstate 
commerce.152 More recently, the onset of our current era of 
globalization has entailed increased capital and labor mobility across 
national borders and diminished the ability of nation-states to 
effectively regulate what has become a transnational economy and 
labor market.153 As the Introduction pointed out, cities and states 
have assumed a far greater role in regulating the impacts of 
globalization to fill the vacuum left by federal government inaction. 
 
 149.  See Garnett, supra note 72, at 1193–95 (documenting evidence of an increasing 
home-working trend). 
 150.  See id. at 1222–28 (commenting on the “New Urbanism”). 
 151.  See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 319–20 
(1993) (citing Michael Sorkin’s use of term “ageographical city” to critique local government 
law’s depiction of municipalities as autonomous subjects). 
 152.  See Young, supra note 84, at 150–53. 
 153.  For some useful discussions of globalization’s effect on the nation-state, see, for 
example, YALE H. FERGUSON & RICHARD W. MANSBACH, GLOBALIZATION: THE RETURN OF 
BORDERS TO A BORDERLESS WORLD? 75–78 (2012); Mauro F. Guillén, Is Globalization 
Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Debates in the Social Science Literature, in 
READINGS IN GLOBALIZATION 4, 11–13 (George Ritzer & Zeynep Atalay eds., 2010); Susan 
Strange, The Westfailure System, in READINGS IN GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 161. 
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It is perhaps for all of these reasons that courts have strayed from the 
liberal separation of spheres in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
recognizing that states and the national government have 
concurrent authority.154 
However, courts have proven reluctant to abandon the idea of 
dual federalism entirely. Recent Supreme Court cases in the 
Commerce Clause area demonstrate that the Court is still concerned 
with determining the boundary line between the “truly national” 
and the “truly local,”155 and that the market/family distinction 
remains a preferred mechanism for drawing this boundary line.156 
Moreover, as Telluride demonstrates, local government law in 
particular remains firmly entrenched in its liberal imperio phase. On 
this point, it is notable that many of the Supreme Court’s recent 
cases arguably reviving dual federalism involved disputes between 
national and local governments, not state governments.157 In the 
following section, I speculate as to why courts have persisted in 
maintaining their attachment to liberal ideology despite its evident 
unworkability and why local government law appears particularly in 
thrall to that ideology. The remainder of this Part then discusses 
some of the consequences that have followed from the effort to 
maintain separate spheres during an increasingly borderless age. 
 
 154.  See Young, supra note 84, at 152 (stating that dual federalism has waned in 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence because “changes in the American economy and society at 
large . . . made exclusive enclaves of state (or federal) authority increasingly difficult to identify 
and to police”). 
 155.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
 156.  See id. at 615 (striking down the federal Violence Against Women Act as exceeding 
commerce power and noting that an expansive reading of commerce power would authorize 
Congress to improperly encroach upon “family law and other areas of traditional state 
regulation”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564–65 (1995) (reasoning that an 
expansive view of the Commerce Clause would inappropriately allow the federal government 
to regulate “family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody)”). 
 157.  See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (holding that a federal 
statute cannot preempt state law governing municipal provision of telecommunications services 
because it would interfere with state authority over municipalities); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (prohibiting the federal government from commandeering local law 
enforcement officers to enforce federal statutes on the grounds that states “remain 
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority”). 
04.STAHL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016  9:00 PM 
177 Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization 
 223 
A. The Enduring Appeal of Liberalism in a Global Age 
How can the liberal separation of spheres survive in this 
postmodern time of globalization? In part, as we have already seen, 
courts are wedded to a mode of jurisprudence in which law can be 
decisively separated from politics, so that the judicial process can be 
portrayed as objective and scientific, rather than messy, contingent, 
and political.158 Though judicial thought has evolved from the 
“classical” era of legal reasoning and courts often recognize that law 
involves the balancing of competing interests, the lure of an 
objective science of jurisprudence remains strong, as evidenced by 
the courts’ inability to completely disavow dual federalism in the 
Commerce Clause context. 
While globalization has undoubtedly complicated the liberal 
confidence in the separation of spheres, it has also in many ways 
intensified the allure of liberalism. Importantly, the liberal divide 
between the family and the market initially gained popularity in 
response to an earlier era of globalization during the nineteenth 
century. Emerging nation-states found the separation of spheres 
invented by liberal jurists congenial because it enabled states to be 
merged together into a transnational economy but at the same time 
allowed them to assert the necessity and legitimacy of the individual 
state as a protector of the family, which was now defined as 
something “popular, political, religious, cultural and particular, and 
therefore . . . eminently national.”159 In our current age of 
globalization, observers have similarly remarked that nation-states 
must navigate between the competing pressures of global economic 
 
 158.  The Supreme Court’s “political question” doctrine, under which federal courts 
must decline to adjudicate matters deemed more appropriate for political than judicial 
decisionmaking, is one area in which the Court has expressed its continuing desire to separate 
law from politics. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–81 (2004) (holding the claim 
of political gerrymandering to be a nonjusticiable political question because of the lack of 
judicially discernible and manageable standards, noting that “law pronounced by the courts 
must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions”); see also infra note 197 
and accompanying text (discussing the political question doctrine in context of home rule). 
 159.  Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 646 (2003); Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony 
Distinction and Its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
811, 839 (2010) (stating that during nineteenth-century globalization, nations throughout 
the world “all adopted the same distinction between at least nominal respect for local family 
law and insistence on the adoption of the universal private law of the market”). 
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homogeneity and cultural particularity, between “McWorld” and 
“jihad.”160 The notion of separate spheres for the market and the 
family is one way of balancing these considerations. 
In striking this balance, local governments play a critical role. On 
one hand, cities have long been considered impediments to the 
creation of a universal economic market. Indeed, David Barron has 
shown that the fear of big-city political machines meddling in private 
economic affairs was one of the central concerns of the home-rule 
movement.161 On the other hand, as we have also seen, the local was 
perceived as the only hope of preserving the sentiment of family life 
against the creeping homogenization and impersonality of modern 
commercial society.162 Hence, the need to fix the status of local 
governments within the market/family divide has been amplified by 
the pressures of globalization. 
There is an additional difficulty. The tension between the 
universality of the global marketplace and the particularity of the 
local sphere threatens to leave out the national. To maintain its 
salience in a global age, the nation-state must simultaneously assert 
itself as the vanguard of the nation’s cultural particularity against 
global capitalism and its status as a transcendent and universal force 
against local parochialism.163 The notion of separate spheres—a clear 
divide between the family and the market, presided over and 
mediated by the state—can preserve the integrity of all 
three domains. 
B. The Marxian Critique of Liberalism 
Thus, at least, in theory. In practice, as we have just seen, it has 
been extremely difficult to maintain the separation of spheres. This 
 
 160.  See BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD: TERRORISM’S CHALLENGE TO 
DEMOCRACY (1996) (describing the conflict in the globalizing world between “McWorld,” 
referring to the homogenizing force of globalization, and “jihad,” referring to groups that seek 
to turn back this homogenizing process by redrawing boundaries and asserting ethnic, racial, 
tribal, or religious identities). 
 161.  See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra notes 74–79, 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See FERGUSON & MANSBACH, supra note 153, at 30 (describing how the nation-
state is being pulled apart by both globalization and localization); infra notes 224–37 
(describing how the state attempts to resolve this difficulty by deploying different conceptions 
of territory). 
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difficulty was noticed early in the life of the modern nation-state by 
one of liberalism’s most insightful critics, Karl Marx.164 Marx saw 
clearly that the neat liberal boundary between the public and the 
private could not be maintained because capitalism was incapable of 
being bounded and would necessarily obliterate institutions designed 
to constrain it.165 In such an environment, the liberal separation 
project could only serve to disguise the predominance of capitalism 
in all the supposedly independent spheres. In his famous essay on the 
Jewish question, Marx mocked the state’s claim to be independent of 
civil society as an “unreal universality.”166 The state emancipates itself 
“politically” from civil society by formally excluding criteria such as 
wealth, property, or religious affiliation from the political sphere 
(e.g., prohibiting the establishment of religion, abolishing property 
qualifications for voting), but fails to accomplish genuine “human” 
emancipation because distinctions based on wealth and the like are 
allowed to persist in civil society outside the realm of the state.167 
Worse, political emancipation casts a veneer that legitimizes, while 
disguising, the continued enslavement to economic affairs in civil 
society. In his later works, Marx and his collaborator Friedrich 
Engels viewed the state and liberal ideology as mere 
“superstructures” that disguised an underlying conflict between 
labor and capital.168 As they wrote: “[A]ll struggles within the 
state . . . are merely the illusory forms . . . in which the real struggles 
 
 164.  See Walzer, supra note 55, at 317 (noting that Marxists have been skeptical of the 
liberal “art of separation” because they “have generally stressed both the radical 
interdependence of the different social spheres and the direct and indirect causal links that 
radiate outward from the economy”); see also PETER SAUNDERS, SOCIAL THEORY AND THE 
URBAN QUESTION 16–17 (2d. ed. 1986) (arguing that for Marx “any explanation of the part 
can only be accomplished through an analysis of the whole”). 
 165.  See GEORGE RITZER, GLOBALIZATION: A BASIC TEXT 6 (2010) (describing how, 
according to Marx, “many of the solid, material realities that preceded capitalism (e.g.[,] the 
structures of feudalism) were ‘melted’ by it and transformed into liquids”). 
 166.  See Marx, supra note 63, at 32–34. For a discussion of Marx’s essay that stresses 
its connections to local government law in the United States, specifically the applicability of 
the “one person, one vote” rule to local governments, see Stahl, supra note 63, at 20, 
24−25, 46−47. 
 167.  See Marx, supra note 63, at 30−34. 
 168.  See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 47 (Prometheus 
Books 1998) (1845). 
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of the different classes are fought out among one another.”169 The 
capitalist class, being stronger, inevitably dominates, and the state, 
though appearing to be independent and autonomous of capitalism, 
becomes an instrument of class domination.170 
While Marx did not expressly take on the market/family 
distinction, Frances Olsen’s classic article on the market and the 
family used Marx to argue that this distinction was a pretense 
designed to habituate individuals to the harshness of the capitalist 
economic system. As Olsen writes: “The family offered men an 
altruistic motive and justification for carrying on their individualistic 
struggles in the marketplace. It also offered men compensation for 
their suffering in the debasing world and thus reduced resistance to 
the increasing dehumanization of the market.”171 At the same time, 
the depiction of the marketplace as a sphere of cutthroat competition 
made it “a fearsome alternative to the home and thus tended to 
reconcile women to being consigned to their own sphere.”172 The ill 
consequences of the market/family divide were hidden from people, 
however, because it became a structure of consciousness that they 
internalized as a natural feature of civil society rather than a 
deliberate construction of the state.173 
Imperio home rule, which incorporates the market/family 
distinction within its state/local distinction, has a similar effect to 
that described by Marx and Olsen. As Section C below 
demonstrates, the neutral rhetoric of boundary maintenance that 
characterizes the state/local distinction disguises the ways in which 
imperio home rule actually secures the dominance of mobile capital 
over immobile local governments. However, imperio home rule also 
complicates the Marxian narrative a bit. As I have just emphasized, 
the state has not resigned itself to being a mere fig leaf for capitalism, 
but has sought to assert its independence by cultivating a sense of 
national cultural distinctiveness. Because the local has long been seen 
 
 169.  See id. at 52; see also DAVID HARVEY, The Marxian Theory of the State, in SPACES OF 
CAPITAL 267, 269 (2001). 
 170.  See MARX & ENGELS, supra note 168, at 67−71, 98−101 (arguing that although 
the state is organized to effect the will of the ruling class, it presents itself as representative of a 
“universal” public interest). 
 171.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1524. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See id. at 1498. 
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as the fount of such distinctiveness, the state has accordingly 
encouraged local parochialism to flourish. At the same time, to 
preserve its status as a “universal” entity, the state must also keep a 
firm controlling hand on the local. Imperio home rule, as we shall 
see in Section D, gives the impression that local distinctiveness is 
being permitted to proliferate insofar as local governments have the 
exclusive power to regulate and protect the family, while under that 
guise the state plays a predominant role in determining what familial 
arrangements it will allow local governments to protect. In short, 
imperio home rule disguises the state’s hegemony over the local in 
much the same way that it disguises capital’s hegemony over 
the local. 
It makes sense that both capital and the state have a similar 
interest in the suppression of the local. Despite the tensions between 
them, capital and the modern state have long been linked together, 
and to the ideology of liberalism. As the geographer David Harvey 
explains, capitalism and the state are both dependent upon an 
impersonal mode of authority, the concept of an abstracted “juridical 
person” or individual citizen, a uniform standard of exchange, the 
concepts of liberty and economic equality, and free capital and labor 
mobility.174 For these reasons, they have each been threatened by the 
city, which poses collectivism against individuality and asserts the 
value of place as against free mobility.175 Accordingly, it has long been 
a touchstone of local-government scholarship that liberal ideology 
has attempted to displace local governments with state control, to 
create a direct relationship between the state and individuals without 
the mediation of collectivities like the city.176 
As Section E concludes, however, globalization has caused the 
liberal alliance between capitalism and the state to unravel. In 
accordance with Marx’s prediction, capitalism is beginning to 
 
 174.  See HARVEY, supra note 169, at 272−73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175.  See, e.g., Thomas Bender, Intellectuals, Cities, and Citizenship in the United States: 
The 1890s and 1990s, in CITIES AND CITIZENSHIP 21, 24−25 (James Holston ed., 1999) 
(describing the context that led to the adoption of home rule: “Cities and the essential 
character of city life seemed to constitute a challenge to the premises of the laissez-faire market 
celebrated by the regnant political economy of the Gilded Age. Cities were collective in spirit 
and in experience. Thus, they might be the staging ground for mounting a collectivist 
challenge to excessive individualism.”). 
 176.  See, e.g., Frug, supra note 56, at 1074–82, 1099–109. 
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overtake the nation-state, threatening the state’s authority and 
relevance. At the same time, as Marx also predicted, the liberal 
notion of separate spheres effectively disguises capital’s emerging 
predominance over the state. As it turns out, our best hope to resist 
capital’s ambitions is to re-energize the local. 
C. Capital 
1. Marx in space: Geography and capital 
Following Marx and Olsen, this section shows how imperio 
home rule enables and disguises the dominance of capital over the 
local via the market/family distinction. As we recall, imperio home 
rule instantiates the market/family distinction spatially by assigning 
commercial matters to the sphere of the state and family matters to 
the sphere of the local. Though Marx largely neglected the problem 
of space (as he did the family),177 over the past few decades scholars 
in the field of geography have explored the role of space within 
Marx’s analytical framework. The geographer Robert Sack has 
argued that territory—the notion that a political authority exercises 
control over everything within a particular place rather than over 
specific individuals or conduct178—is ideologically useful for the state 
because it enables politically-charged decisions to be disguised under 
the seeming neutrality and pre-political nature of spatial boundaries: 
“[l]egal and conventional assignments of behavior to territories” are 
“so important and well understood in the well-socialized individual 
that one often takes such assignments for granted and thus territory 
appears as the agent doing the controlling.”179 One manifestation of 
this phenomenon, according to Sack, is that socioeconomic tensions 
or inequalities are often described as conflicts between territories, 
such as the city versus the suburb or Rustbelt versus Sunbelt.180 In 
this regard, territory is, much like the market/family distinction, 
what Olsen refers to as “a structure of consciousness” that “shapes 
 
 177.  See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES:THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLACE 10 (1987) (“Marx gave relatively little attention to space as an analytical 
problem.”); HARVEY, supra note 65, at xiii (noting that Marx was given to “dismissing the 
question of geographic variation as an ‘unnecessary complication’”). 
 178.  See Sack, supra note 22, at 55; see also SASSEN, supra note 22, at 6. 
 179.  Sack, supra note 22, at 59. 
 180.  See id. at 63. 
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the society’s view of what social relationships are ‘natural’ and, 
therefore, what social reforms are possible.”181  
As Sack notes, because territory has this naturalizing quality, it 
meshes neatly with Marx’s analysis of capitalism and class conflict: 
though the state generally supports the hegemony of capitalism, it 
can obfuscate that hegemony and assert its own neutrality as 
between capital and labor by making capitalism’s dominance appear 
as the product of territorial divisions that occur naturally rather than 
being created by capitalism and the state.182 This again echoes 
Olsen’s assertion that the market/family distinction assumes the 
character of “a natural attribute of civil society rather than the 
responsibility of the state.”183 
In their celebrated book Urban Fortunes, John Logan and 
Harvey Molotch subsequently elaborated on Sack’s ideas. According 
to Logan and Molotch, conflicts over space are part of a broader 
struggle between capitalists who seek to exploit space as a fungible 
market commodity (“exchange value”) and those who wish to 
maintain the space’s non-commercial value as a site of collective 
sentiment or tradition (“use value”).184 These competing interests 
seek to manipulate the scale of governmental decision making—
statewide or local, for example—depending on which scale favors 
their own interests in particular situations.185 Logan and Molotch 
even mention home rule specifically, noting that the “[t]he limits of 
home rule . . . expand and contract in response to the power shifts” 
between use and exchange value interests.186 Inevitably, according to 
Logan and Molotch, either because of capital’s superior resources or 
the bias of the state in favor of capitalism, exchange value prevails 
over use value.187 
 
 181.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1498. 
 182.  See Sack, supra note 22, at 67. 
 183.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1528. 
 184.  See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 177, at 31–49. 
 185.  Id. at 36−37 (stating that efforts to influence the scale of regulation “represent 
strategic manipulations of the sites of decision making in order to influence distributional 
outcomes among and within places”). 
 186.  Id. at 36. 
 187.  Id. at 178 (“[T]he most durable feature in U.S. urban planning is the manipulation 
of government resources to serve the exchange interests of local elites . . . .”). 
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As Marx, Sack, and Olsen would predict, the essentially 
instrumental nature of land-use conflicts, and the inevitable triumph 
of exchange value over use value in those conflicts, are disguised 
because territorial scale has a quality of apparent naturalness that can 
easily be exploited by mobile capital. According to Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, the state uses scale to “promote the expression of 
certain types of interests and disputes and suppress that of others” 
because “[e]ach scale reveals a phenomenon and distorts or hides 
others.”188 For instance, Richard Walker and Michael Heiman argue 
that efforts during the 1970s to displace local land-use control with 
statewide control were often couched in neutral rhetoric about the 
benefits of statewide uniformity but were in fact driven by large 
developers seeking a more favorable forum for land-use decision 
making.189 Under these circumstances, the rhetoric of the public 
interest “serves as an ideological screen for pursuit” of exchange 
values over use values.190 
Likewise, Logan and Molotch argue that land-use regulatory 
structures such as planning and zoning are purportedly neutral 
devices, surrounded with “‘strategic rituals’ that connote expertise 
and efficiency,” but are actually designed to systematically favor 
exchange value interests.191 In this sense, again, scale and territory 
function as structures of consciousness that shape our worldview of 
what is normal or natural, and thus minimize our capacity to 
challenge the ideological underpinnings of those structures. 
2. Exchange value and use value in home-rule doctrine 
 Logan and Molotch’s argument that space disguises the class 
conflict embedded in the use value/exchange value distinction 
applies readily to imperio home rule. In home-rule doctrine, the use 
value/exchange value distinction is incorporated into the state/local 
and market/family distinctions, which have of course now assumed a 
spatial dimension. The consequence is that the ideological struggle 
 
 188.  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern 
Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 284, 297 (1987). 
 189.  See Richard A. Walker & Michael K. Heiman, Quiet Revolution for Whom?, 71 
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 67 (1981). 
 190.  See id. at 82. 
 191.  See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 177, at 154, 147–99. 
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between exchange value and use value interests is disguised as a 
technical question about the appropriate boundary between the 
spheres. I first explore exchange value’s embeddedness within the 
conception of statewide matters, then turn to how use value has 
been incorporated into the conception of local matters. In both 
cases, as we will see, the way that home-rule jurisprudence obscures 
the exchange value/use value dichotomy facilitates the dominance 
of capital. 
 a. The state, the market, and exchange value. 
 (1) Class conflict and the rhetoric of neutrality. Let us 
reconsider two of the cases we have seen so far, Telluride and 
American Financial Services. Telluride, we recall, involved a local 
affordable housing ordinance that capped rental rates on new 
housing in the city for the sake of ensuring that Telluride’s 
workforce could afford to live locally. As the court summarized it, 
the ordinance implicated on one hand “preserving investment capital 
in the rental market”192 and “protecting the state’s overall economic 
health”193 by ensuring uniform statewide regulation of rents. On the 
other hand, Telluride had a “valid interest in controlling land use, 
reducing regional traffic congestion and air pollution, containing 
sprawl, preserving a sense of community, and improving the quality 
of life of the Town’s employees.”194 American Financial Services 
dealt with Oakland’s effort to regulate predatory lending. In 
challenging the ordinance, lenders stressed the importance of 
uniform lending standards throughout the state; in defending it, the 
city emphasized the impacts of predatory lending on particular low-
income, minority neighborhoods.195 Reviewing these cases in light of 
Logan and Molotch’s framework, it becomes evident that the 
disputes between the parties in these cases were essentially conflicts 
between exchange and use values, the former being capital’s interest 
in treating land as a fungible object of market exchange and the 
latter being local residents’ desire to treat land as a collective asset to 
 
 192.  Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 39 (Colo. 2000). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See supra notes 28–45 and accompanying text (discussing American 
Financial Services). 
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be preserved for its non-pecuniary value to the community. As 
Logan and Molotch suggest, we can speculate that these competing 
interests have “strategic” motivations for advocating in favor of 
statewide or local control; namely, a ruling that the matter was 
statewide would resolve the conflict in favor of exchange value and a 
ruling that it was local would resolve the matter in favor of 
use value.196 
 As the geographical analysis further suggests, moreover, the 
state/local question involved in these cases was not a technical one 
but rather a political question as to whether use or exchange value 
should prevail: that is, whether to favor mobile capital or 
community residents.197 As we have already seen, there is no 
objective, technical way in our global age to choose between the 
statewide and the local because these categories, like the market 
and the family, constantly overlap. Any argument in favor of 
statewide uniformity can be met with an equally forceful argument 
on behalf of local diversity, and vice versa. As Nestor Davidson 
writes of Telluride, “[t]he court’s discussion of extraterritorial 
impact and the value of uniformity could as easily have been 
replaced with debates about the instrumental value of local control 
of housing markets and the interests of vulnerable renters.”198 The 
court was presented, in other words, with an ideological choice 
between two competing sets of values. 
 
 196.  See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 177, at 36−37 (stating that efforts to 
influence the scale of decision making “represent strategic manipulations of the sites of 
decision making in order to influence distributional outcomes among and within places”). 
 197.  I use the term “political question” in the colloquial sense that the matter involves 
complex policy issues that are not resolvable on formal grounds rather than the legal sense that 
the matter is nonjusticiable under the “political question” doctrine. Nevertheless, the absence 
of principled, judicially-manageable standards for distinguishing state from local matters 
suggests that home rule could be considered a political question in the legal sense as well. See, 
e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (holding a claim of political gerrymandering 
to be a nonjusticiable political question because of the lack of judicially discernible and 
manageable standards, noting that “law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, 
and based upon reasoned distinctions”). 
 198.  Nestor M. Davidson, Vertical Learning: On Baker and Rodriguez’s “Constitutional 
Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny,” 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1425, 1430–31 (2009) (“Discerning 
some inherent meaning in concepts like ‘local’ and ‘statewide’ can prove a tempting ground on 
which to make proxy judgments about the merits of whatever it is the state and local 
governments are fighting over in the first place.”). 
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Nevertheless, the judges involved in Telluride and American 
Financial Services did not frame the inquiry this way; rather, in 
much the same manner that Logan and Molotch described elites 
using “strategic rituals” and neutral rhetoric about the “public 
interest” to disguise the instrumental nature of land-use conflict, 
Telluride and American Financial Services approached the 
statewide/local question as if there were a straightforward, 
objectively verifiable and noncontroversial way of resolving it. In 
Telluride, for example, the court began from the presupposition 
that Telluride’s regulation was “commercial,” and thus began its 
analysis by arguing that “uniform access to state markets” is “an 
important state concern.”199 Accordingly, it focused on the effect 
the regulation would have on mobile commercial interests to the 
near exclusion of the interests of the local population in regulating 
the use of land within its territory.200  
Similarly in American Financial Services, the court began its 
analysis by citing the proposition that “[c]ertain areas of human 
behavior command statewide uniformity, especially the regulation of 
statewide commercial activities.”201 Starting from this premise, the 
court asserted that “[c]ommercial reality today would confound any 
effective regulation of mortgage lending based on potentially 
hundreds of competing and inconsistent measures at the local 
level,”202 and largely neglected the arguments advanced on Oakland’s 
behalf for why the matter required local treatment. On the other 
hand, the two dissents in Telluride, characterizing the matter as a 
land-use regulation, focused on how Telluride’s ordinance would 
affect the community itself and gave less attention to how it affected 
statewide financial markets.203 Of all five relevant opinions, only the 
 
 199.  3 P.3d at 38. 
 200.  Interestingly, though the Telluride court apparently recognized that its task was to 
balance the competing interests in statewide versus local regulation, and although it gave lip 
service to what it called Telluride’s “valid interest” in enacting the affordable housing 
regulation, its substantive analysis focused entirely on the interest in uniformity and did not 
engage at all with Telluride’s argument for local control. See id. at 38–39. 
 201.  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 823 (Cal. 2005) 
(emphasis added) (quoting N. Cal. Psychiatric Soc’y v. City of Berkeley, 223 Cal. Rptr. 609, 
612 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See 3 P.3d at 45–47 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting); id. at 47–48 (Hobbs, 
J., dissenting). 
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dissent in American Financial Services actually balanced the interests 
of the community against the interests of mobile capital.204 
It should be clear that although the judges in these cases did not 
expressly use the rhetoric of exchange value and use value, the 
opinions nevertheless trafficked in those ideological constructs. 
When the majority opinions speak of the need for uniformity and the 
imperative to create universal economic markets unencumbered by 
local idiosyncrasy (“[c]ommercial reality today would confound any 
effective regulation of mortgage lending based on potentially 
hundreds of competing and inconsistent measures at the local 
level”),205 they are implicitly prioritizing exchange value over use 
value. When the dissents speak of the need for communities to 
preserve the nonpecuniary values of place in the face of capital’s 
impositions (predatory lending threatens “the degradation of entire 
neighborhoods” and worsens “urban blight” in targeted 
communities),206 they are prioritizing use value over exchange value. 
In these opinions, however, the conceptual and rhetorical tools 
of imperio home rule enable the judges to mask what is in essence an 
ideological choice between use and exchange value under the guise 
that they are simply engaged in the neutral, objective task of judicial 
boundary maintenance. As both Telluride and American Financial 
Services demonstrate, imperio home rule creates an automatic 
association between commercial regulation and the notion of 
statewide uniformity (the sphere of the market), and a similar 
association between land-use regulation and the idea of local 
diversity (the sphere of the family). By “automatic,” I mean that 
there is no need for a judge to explain how he or she leapt from the 
premise that a matter is “commercial” to the conclusion that 
uniformity should be favored over diversity (or exchange value over 
use value) because it is simply understood that commercial matters 
require uniformity and therefore the point requires no further 
analysis or justification.207 What makes these associations automatic 
 
 204.  See 104 P.3d at 832–34 (George, C.J., dissenting). 
 205.  Id. at 823 (majority opinion). 
 206.  Id. at 834 (George, C.J., dissenting). 
 207.  This automatic association is part and parcel of a structure of consciousness. As 
Duncan Kennedy explains, legal consciousness means that judges “share premises about the 
salient aspects of the legal order that are so basic that actors rarely if ever bring them 
consciously to mind.” Kennedy, supra note 67, at 6. 
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are the dual structures of consciousness at work—the state/local 
divide and the market/family divide. As we recall, Sack tells us that 
“[l]egal and conventional assignments of behavior to territories 
are . . . so important and well understood in the well-socialized 
individual that one often takes such assignments for granted and 
thus territory appears as the agent doing the controlling.”208 The 
state/local divide is of course a way of assigning “behavior to 
territories.” In turn, the particular behaviors assigned to each 
territory are the suite of cultural expectations associated with the 
market and the family, respectively. We recall the words of Henri 
Lefebvre: “The family, the school, the workplace, the church, and 
so on—each possesses an ‘appropriate’ space. . . . In these spaces, 
a system of ‘adapted’ expectations and responses—rarely 
articulated as such because they seem obvious—acquire a quasi-
natural self-evidence in everyday life and common sense.”209 The 
marketplace is the “universal” sphere of abstract impersonal 
transactions, and, therefore, it is natural that we should favor 
mobile capital interests whenever a matter is framed as commercial 
in nature; the family is the “particular” sphere of the hearth and 
home, and, therefore, it is natural that we should favor existing 
local residents when a matter is framed as affecting the family. By 
structuring our behavior in this way, imperio home rule treats the 
exchange value/use value dichotomy “as something natural and 
not as the responsibility of the state.”210 
 (2) Capital, uneven development, and territory. Thus, as Marx 
predicts, the separation of spheres under imperio home rule 
functions to disguise class conflict. The dichotomy between use and 
exchange value is made to appear as the natural outcome of a 
common-sense territorial division between state and local, market 
and family. But Marx predicted more: by disguising class conflict, 
liberalism would also disguise the inevitable predominance of 
capitalism within that conflict.211 Inevitable or not, it is surely not 
 
 208.  See Sack, supra note 22, at 59. 
 209.  See LEFEBVRE, supra note 82, at 225. 
 210.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1506. 
 211.  See MARX & ENGELS, supra note 168, at 67−71, 98−101 (arguing that the state is 
organized to effect the will of the ruling class but presents itself as representative of a 
“universal” public interest); Marx, supra note 63, at 30−34 (describing how “political 
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coincidental that the majority in Telluride and American Financial 
Services sided with exchange value over use value. The very idea of 
territory embodied in imperio home rule is deeply enmeshed with 
capitalism. Territory, Sack explains, is designed to create an 
impersonal connection between individuals and authority based on 
place.212 Place becomes a conceptually empty substance that can be 
filled as the state’s administrative needs require.213 The idea of place’s 
impersonality and conceptual emptiness is useful for the courts 
because it gives territory the appearance of neutrality. But it also 
necessarily privileges exchange value over use value. Conceptualizing 
land as an abstract, homogenous space, stripped of its idiosyncratic 
value as a particular place, enables it to be treated as a fungible 
commodity suitable for market exchange.214 
The notion of land as abstract, homogenous space suitable for 
market exchange is reinforced by imperio home rule’s territorial 
division of authority between state and local spheres. Cases like 
Telluride and American Financial Services, as we have seen, train 
their focus on the impacts of local regulation on statewide markets 
and largely ignore the converse—the impacts of statewide markets on 
local places. This occurs because the exchange value/use value 
dichotomy makes markets and places appear to be opposing forces in 
a zero-sum conflict. We are led to believe that, were it not for local 
regulation, capitalism’s impacts would be smoothly uniform across 
local borders. Place, on this reading, is something entirely abstract 
and impersonal, a neutral space within which market transactions can 
occur. Geographers have shown, however, that it is a crucial 
component of capitalism to unevenly exploit space, investing in 
 
emancipation” disguises failure to achieve “human emancipation”). See generally supra notes 
164–70 and accompanying text. 
 212.  See Sack, supra note 22, at 59, 60 (stating that territory makes relationships, 
especially hierarchical relationships, impersonal). 
 213.  See LEFEBVRE, supra note 82, at 227 (arguing that the state’s aim is to make space 
“appear homogenous, the same throughout, organized according to a rationality of the 
identical and the repetitive that allows the State to introduce its presence, control and 
surveillance in the most isolated corners”). 
 214.  See Stahl, supra note 63, at 26–27 (“Once land’s value was expressed through the 
universal medium of money, stripped of its local particularities, it could be easily bought and 
sold in the market by impersonal, absentee investors with no connection to the soil.”). 
Geographers often distinguish between abstract, homogenous “space” and particularized, 
collective “place.” See generally YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE (1977). 
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certain places and disinvesting in others.215 Importantly, this uneven 
development often has a class and racial dimension, as affluent whites 
have access to the spaces preferred by capital investors while the poor 
and minorities are left to fend for themselves in the spaces neglected 
or exploited by investors.216 Indeed, as the dissent in American 
Financial Services emphasized, practices like predatory lending were 
heavily concentrated in low-income, minority communities like 
Oakland, devastating those areas while leaving others unscathed.217 
Nevertheless, because the logic of imperio home rule dictates 
that regulating the marketplace is a statewide function requiring 
uniformity across borders and that the market is sharply 
distinguishable from the local sphere of the family where place is 
paramount, the court’s characterization of predatory lending as 
commercial (i.e., within the sphere of the market) a fortiori caused it 
to ignore the localized impacts of mobile capitalism. The class, racial, 
and spatial inequality that capital investment begets is obfuscated by 
the rhetoric of commerce and uniformity. As such, the case for local 
regulation of capital is weakened. In this way, imperio home rule 
supports and disguises capital’s hegemony over the local. 
 b. The local, the family, and use value. Based on the foregoing, it 
might be concluded that courts always rule in favor of statewide 
uniformity, as that tends to advantage exchange value and mobile 
capital. In fact, as we have already seen, courts are often highly 
deferential toward local government land-use regulation, even where 
such regulation is very restrictive of new development, leading to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that courts often prefer use value over 
exchange value. This is a deceptive picture, though. In our 
discussion of the separate spheres ideology, we saw that courts 
rhetorically elevated the family over the marketplace; as Frances 
Olsen observes, however, this rhetoric actually served to neutralize 
resistance to the increasing dominance of the market. She writes: 
 
 215.  See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY 346–55 (1991) (arguing that capital is 
drawn to advantages of particular places and is only imperfectly mobile); HARVEY, supra note 
146, at 293–96 (arguing that capital investment is heavily place-dependent). 
 216.  See, e.g., NORMAN I. FAINSTEIN & SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, RESTRUCTURING THE 
CITY 2–3 (1986) (arguing that uneven development in urban spaces leads to class and racial 
inequality among those spaces). 
 217.  See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 832–34 (Cal. 2005). 
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“The family offered men an altruistic motive and justification for 
carrying on their individualistic struggles in the marketplace. It also 
offered men compensation for their suffering in the debasing world 
and thus reduced resistance to the increasing dehumanization of 
the market.”218 
The exchange value/use value dichotomy performs a similar 
function. Although the rhetoric surrounding local government land-
use regulation sounds in use value, local government land-use 
regulation often has the practical impact of advantaging exchange 
value.219 Capital investors—developers, real estate financiers, and the 
like—often prefer uniformity when they can exploit the advantages 
of particular places (such as Oakland’s vulnerability to predatory 
lending). When capital investors are indifferent as between different 
places within a region, however, they may prefer local control 
because they can then leverage one “autonomous” municipality 
against another simply by threatening to relocate to a different 
municipality. The ability of mobile capital to so exploit local 
government is facilitated by the fact that authority over land-use 
decisions in any particular metropolitan area is often fragmented 
among dozens of municipalities, a state of affairs that nominally 
exists in order to enable local control of the home and family.220 
According to Logan and Molotch, the fragmentation of local land-
use authority means that the scale at which real estate capital 
operates is not matched by the scale of the jurisdictional units 
regulating it. This “pattern of suburban growth has provided capital 
investors with new opportunities for playing one small unit against 
another, thereby maximizing their options and further straining the 
resources of weak places.”221  
As Logan and Molotch argue, then, mobile capital interests often 
seek to manipulate the scale at which decisions are made based on 
 
 218.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1524. 
 219.  LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 177, at 14 (“In contrast to the use value rhetoric 
that regularly cloaks government policy making, the policies themselves routinely bolster 
exchange gains for the powerful.”). 
 220.  See Briffault, supra note 18, at 1132–41 (describing the fragmentation of land use 
authority); Schragger, supra note 104, at 488–98 (describing the interlocal competition arising 
from fragmentation and how mobile capital can exploit this competition); Briffault, supra note 
118, at 382–86 (arguing that local government law has been structured around the concept of 
local government as protector of home and family). 
 221.  LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 177, at 187. 
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what suits their needs in particular situations.222 And they usually 
have the ability to manipulate scale in this way because they are 
territorially unbounded and thus can choose the scale of regulation 
they prefer on an ad hoc basis whereas local governments—thanks to 
imperio home rule—cannot escape from their territorial spheres to 
regulate capital more broadly. At the same time, though capital 
investors’ reasons for advocating one scale versus another are entirely 
instrumental, they can always present their arguments in the neutral 
language of statewide uniformity or local diversity, drawing upon the 
“natural” cultural associations of the different territorial spheres. 
Likewise, the fragmentation of authority among dozens of 
competing municipalities causes the phenomenon of uneven 
economic development—along with all the racial and socioeconomic 
inequality it entails—to appear as a consequence of the territorial 
diffusion of governmental power rather than a conscious choice by 
capital investors.223 This phenomenon confirms Marx’s insights that 
capitalism cannot be constrained within a conceptual envelope and 
that efforts to do so ultimately facilitate and disguise its dominance. 
 Based on the discussion so far, it appears that the state plays a 
fairly passive role, simply bolstering capitalism’s efforts to suppress 
local autonomy. This conclusion would be consistent with Marx’s 
assertion that the state is a mere superstructure that exists to support 
the capitalist economic system. As I have indicated, however, Marx’s 
depiction of the state is incomplete. To maintain its relevance in a 
global age, the state must simultaneously assert its stature as the 
vanguard of local particularity against global capitalism and its 
stature as a universal state transcending local particularism. The state 
accordingly manipulates the state/local distinction under imperio 
home rule to navigate between the universal and the particular. 
 
 222.  See id. at 36–37 (arguing that efforts to influence the scale of decision making 
“represent strategic manipulations of the sites of decision making in order to influence 
distributional outcomes among and within places”). 
 223.  See SAUNDERS, supra note 164, at 155–58 (describing how municipal 
fragmentation deflects accountability for uneven development). The next section pursues 
further how the rhetoric of municipal autonomy over land use and school control disguises the 
state’s responsibility for interlocal inequalities. 
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D. The State 
1. Law in space: The perspective from law and geography 
While geographers like Sack, Logan, and Molotch emphasize 
that territory reinforces and obfuscates the hegemony of capitalism, 
legal scholars like Richard Ford, working at the intersection of law 
and geography, have stressed how law deploys territory to serve and 
disguise the agenda of the nation-state.224 The mechanism through 
which the state does this, according to Ford, should by now be 
familiar: it manipulates scale by constantly vacillating between 
competing territorial conceptions of local governmental authority, 
what Ford calls the “synthetic” and the “organic” modes.225 In the 
synthetic mode, which we can loosely analogize to Logan and 
Molotch’s notion of exchange value, sub-national territorial 
authorities such as local governments are conceptualized as artificial 
creations of the state, “transitory, ephemeral and random.”226 Under 
the synthetic mode, the state acts directly on territorially 
disembodied individuals, providing “a generic set of services to a 
mobile population.”227 The synthetic mode is useful because it 
enables the state to present itself as “universal,” the only relevant 
scale of authority, thereby establishing its predominance over other, 
potentially competing territorial authorities.228 As Ford is quick to 
note, the synthetic mode is also conducive to a capitalist economic 
 
 224.  See generally Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 843 (1999). 
 225.  See id. at 858–61. 
 226.  Id. at 893. 
 227.  Id. at 895. 
 228.  See id. at 860–61, 888–97 (observing that the synthetic mode demonstrates the 
extent to which “American political history is characterized by the progressive centralization of 
power at the expense of locally distinctive political communities such as the states and local 
governments”); see also Santos, supra note 188, at 287 (“The modern state is based on the 
assumption that law operates on a single scale, the scale of the state.”); Stahl, supra note 63, at 
8, 16–17 (describing the “centralization narrative” in which the state seeks to displace local 
territorial diversity “in favor of a universal state that is divorced from all local diversity 
and idiosyncrasy”). 
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system, which is likewise based on impersonal transactions among 
abstractly conceived individuals.229 
While the synthetic mode facilitates the state’s universality, Ford 
argues that the state, much like capital, often has an interest in 
deploying local distinctiveness, and here it uses the “organic” mode, 
which is loosely comparable to the notion of use value. Under the 
organic mode, the state emphasizes the degree to which local 
governments are natural outgrowths of civil society with inherent 
legitimacy, rather than mere creatures of the state.230 The organic 
mode helps the state overcome one of the central dilemmas 
confronting it: while the state desires to transcend parochialism and 
assert its universality, it must also maintain its own independence 
from the homogenizing effects of capitalism and distinguish itself 
culturally from other territorial nation-states. This it does by 
sanctioning and often encouraging local difference. As Ford explains: 
“The emerging national governments needed to assert the sameness 
and uniformity of all their subjects. . . . But at the same time they 
needed to emphasize local distinctiveness because such 
distinctiveness helped to distinguish one nation from another.”231 As 
we recall, the market/family distinction was also initially conceived as 
a way of maintaining national cultural distinctiveness while linking 
states together into a common economic market. 
The organic mode enables the state to strike a delicate balance 
between the universal and the particular. On one hand, while states 
have desired to exploit local distinctiveness, this was not something 
that states—most of which were themselves artificial creations, or 
“imagined communities”—could consciously produce; rather, this 
distinctiveness had to be perceived as emerging “organically” from 
the authentic local people.232 On the other hand, to maintain their 
 
 229.  See Ford, supra note 224, at 890 (stating that the synthetic mode “served both to 
strengthen the federal government and perhaps more importantly, to support the 
homogenizing influence of industrial capitalism”). 
 230.  See id. at 859–61. 
 231.  Id. at 867. 
 232.  See id. at 884 (describing how English jurists rooted the common law in local 
customs at the same time they asserted the common law’s universality in order to give the 
common law an “organic connection to England that would distinguish it from Roman or 
Justinian law”); see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1983) (describing 
the nation as an “imagined community” whose members have little organic connection to each 
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own authority and the project of national centralization, states could 
not simply allow this distinctiveness to flourish independently. They 
required the ability to control the production of local culture, and 
they did so, according to Ford, through the practice of territorial 
jurisdiction. A key component of Ford’s argument is that states use 
territory as a way of choosing which particular local interests to 
recognize, while at the same time making those interests appear as 
the natural outgrowths of an organic local community, thus 
disguising the state’s own role in choosing what interests are 
recognized.233 The state is able to do this, following Sack’s argument, 
because of the seeming naturalness of territorial distinctions. 
According to Ford, “We imagine that the boundaries that define 
local governments and private concentrations of real property are a 
natural and inevitable function of geography and of a commitment 
to self-government or private property.”234 And “because local 
governments are commonly assumed to be the product of individual 
citizens’ choices, which government only ‘recognizes,’ we tend to 
ignore or downplay the role and responsibility of government in 
their creation.”235 Accordingly, states use the “organic” conception 
of local government to manipulate the substantive content of local 
culture while maintaining the pretense that it is the localities 
themselves that independently produce this content.236 The courts 
are only too happy to oblige the state in this endeavor because, as we 
have seen, the asserted neutrality of territory enables them to portray 
their own task as the entirely neutral one of identifying boundaries 
between territorial spheres.237 
 
other but imagine themselves as part of a single community thanks to novels and print media 
creating a sense of shared identity). 
 233.  See Ford, supra note 224, at 887 (“The division of the body politic into organic 
territorial jurisdictions, then, can be seen as a part of a highly centralized scheme of political 
control—a scheme that recognizes particular interests and fails to recognize others and that 
defines and organizes groups through political territories.”). 
 234.  Ford, supra note 81, at 1857. 
 235.  Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and 
Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1997). 
 236.  See id. at 1382–93 (arguing that courts permit racial discrimination in the creation 
of local governments by using a rhetoric of neutrality that makes such discrimination appear as 
the product of voluntary choice rather than state action). 
 237.  See id. at 1368 (arguing that courts like territory because it enables them “to 
reduce normative questions to empirical questions”). 
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Practically speaking, one of the most important consequences of 
the organic/artificial divide is that it disguises interlocal fiscal 
inequalities and de facto racial segregation by making them appear to 
be the product of voluntary choices by “organic” communities 
rather than policy decisions imposed by the state. As Ford writes, the 
state is allowed to “sanction and facilitate segregation” by creating 
and empowering local governments in a way that fosters segregation 
but then disclaiming any responsibility for the segregation that 
follows by characterizing local governments as “voluntary 
associations.”238 For example, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme 
Court claimed that the phenomenon of “white flight” from urban 
areas was a response by white residents to governmental 
desegregation efforts.239 As Ford puts it, the Court saw white flight 
as resulting from private choices to “live and congregate in racially 
separate spheres.”240 According to Ford, however, white flight 
occurred against a background of decades of state-enforced 
separation of races and within a context in which the state has 
enabled white residents to easily flee urban centers for neighboring 
suburbs.241 The notion of local governments as “organic” 
communities causes white flight to appear as a voluntary decision 
that the state merely recognizes, rather than as the result of state 
policies.242 In this respect, the organic/artificial dichotomy functions 
much like the exchange value/use value dichotomy, which similarly 
masks the reality of uneven economic development with the rhetoric 
of uniformity and a corresponding rhetoric of local land-use control.  
In sum, where Logan and Molotch see the scalar division of 
governmental authority as advancing, while obscuring, the 
hegemony of capital, Ford sees it as advancing, while obscuring, the 
state’s role in defining and controlling the contours of local life. 
Both schools, though, follow Marx and Sack in arguing that territory 
and scale function as ideological constructs that conceal and 
perpetuate spatial inequality. 
 
 238.  See id. at 1386. 
 239.  515 U.S. 70, 94–96 (1995) (finding the lower court’s determination that white 
flight is result of de jure segregation “inconsistent with the typical supposition” that white 
flight is more likely to result from desegregation). 
 240.  See Ford, supra note 235, at 1387. 
 241.  See id. at 1387–88. 
 242.  See generally id. 
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2. The local and the family, reconsidered 
Ford’s analysis provides further insight into the consequences of 
imperio home rule. By designating the local as the sphere of the 
home and family, imperio home rule allows the state to exercise strict 
control over family affairs while publicly professing that such affairs 
are a peculiarly local matter. The result is that the state is able to 
deflect responsibility for the interlocal inequalities it creates by 
making them appear as voluntary choices by parochial municipalities. 
Though Ford does not mention the market/family distinction 
explicitly, his discussion of how the state obscures its role in creating 
interlocal inequalities by using the supposed naturalness of territory 
recalls Frances Olsen’s argument that the state obfuscates the 
inequalities it creates within the marketplace and the family by 
drawing upon the apparently natural dichotomy between those 
spheres. Under the market/family dichotomy, Olsen writes, 
“[i]nequality was said to result from the private relations among 
people and was thus a natural attribute of civil society rather than the 
responsibility of the state.”243 It is for this reason that Olsen describes 
the market/family distinction as a structure of consciousness. In the 
previous section, I emphasized that the state/local distinction under 
imperio home rule is also a structure of consciousness with a 
similarly obfuscatory impact in the realm of economic affairs. 
In the realm of family affairs, imperio home rule combines these 
two structures of consciousness—the state/local distinction and the 
family/market distinction—to naturalize and disguise the state’s role 
in producing local inequalities (or, depending on one’s perspective, 
local cultural distinctiveness). Consider initially the famous case of 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.244 This case 
presented two school districts within the city of San Antonio, Texas, 
one rich and one poor. Because of the disparity in the tax base 
between the two districts, the affluent district was able to spend 
almost twice as much per student as the poor school district.245 
Parents in the poorer district asserted that this inequality in school 
financing amounted to an equal protection violation. The U.S. 
 
 243.  Olsen, supra note 57, at 1528. 
 244.  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 245.  See id. at 11–14 (describing a poorer district that spent approximately $356 per 
student, compared with $594 per student in an affluent district). 
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Supreme Court rejected the equal protection argument and, in the 
course of doing so, extolled the virtues of local control of education, 
tying that notion to the idea of home and family. According to the 
Court, local control of school financing entails “the freedom to 
devote more money to the education of one’s children” and an 
opportunity “for participation in the decisionmaking process that 
determines how those local tax dollars will be spent.”246 Moreover, 
the Court reasoned that a more state centered financing system 
could “result in a comparable lessening of desired local 
autonomy.”247 In response to the contention that the financing 
system was unequal, the Court observed that it is “inevitable that 
some localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than 
others.”248 A system committed to local autonomy, in other words, 
must also tolerate some degree of interlocal inequality. 
Rodriguez thus depicts public education funding as a product of 
local choices and local circumstances, an organic outgrowth of 
whatever resources a municipality happens to be “blessed” with. The 
state, as a coercive regulatory entity, is absent from the picture. 
However, as the dissent and commentators since have pointed out, 
the system for financing public education in Texas and elsewhere has 
not been chosen by localities, but is ordained and mandated by the 
state government.249 The Rodriguez Court’s lionization of local 
control is especially inapt because the state of Texas has perhaps the 
most centralized system of public education in the country, in which 
the state board of education makes many of the critical curricular 
decisions for schools throughout the state.250 This means that, at 
 
 246.  See id. at 49–50. 
 247.  Id. at 52. 
 248.  Id. at 54. 
 249.  See Williams, supra note 125, at 108 (“A notable irony is that the fiscal scheme 
involved in Rodriguez was not imposed on the local level: the plaintiffs were challenging a 
mechanism of school financing imposed by the state of Texas.”). 
 250.  The Texas Board of Education’s control over the textbooks used in Texas schools 
has received considerable media attention because the elected board, generally composed of 
non-experts in education, has frequently insisted that textbook publishers adapt the text for 
partisan ideological purposes having little pedagogical value—such as including material on the 
discredited “intelligent design” theory alongside the theory of evolution. Furthermore, the 
sheer size of the Texas textbook market enables the state to dictate to publishers the content of 
textbooks that are then distributed nationwide. See, e.g., Marielle Elisabet Dirkx, Big Brother is 
Reading: An Examination of the Texas Textbook Controversy and the Legacy of Pico, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 29 (2013). 
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bottom, the inequality between school districts in San Antonio is 
neither “inevitable” nor a natural product of geographical diversity, 
but a deliberate policy decision by the state. Yet, because the logic of 
home rule dictates that home and family fall within the sphere of the 
local, the Court is able to evade the state’s responsibility for creating 
an unequal system of school financing by attributing it to the 
happenstance of local difference. Local control of the family is 
unassailable, even when the Court is directly confronted with 
contrary empirical evidence, because two structures of 
consciousness—the market/family distinction and the parallel 
state/local distinction—conspire to make it seem natural and 
inevitable rather than an affirmative construction of the state. 
A similar pattern is evident in the case of Milliken v. Bradley,251 
which followed closely on the heels of Rodriguez. There, a federal 
district court found that the state of Michigan had undertaken 
affirmative de jure measures to racially segregate the Detroit public 
schools and, as an equitable remedy, ordered that students within the 
predominantly black Detroit public schools be bussed across district 
lines to predominantly white school districts in the Detroit 
suburbs.252 The Supreme Court held, however, that the district court 
lacked the equitable power to order such a remedy because to do so 
would violate the integrity of suburban school districts and thus 
disrupt local autonomy over education.253 As the Court stated, “the 
notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as 
a mere administrative convenience” would offend the “deeply 
rooted” tradition of “local control over the operation of schools.”254 
Disturbing local autonomy over education would be especially 
unwarranted, in the Court’s view, because the district court found 
evidence of intentional racial discrimination only within the Detroit 
school system; there was no evidence that neighboring suburban 
jurisdictions committed any acts of de jure segregation. Therefore, 
those suburban school districts could not be held responsible for 
discriminatory actions taking place within Detroit.255 
 
 251.  418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 252.  See id. at 732–34. 
 253.  See id. at 739–47. 
 254.  Id. at 741. 
 255.  See id. at 744–45. 
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As in Rodriguez, Milliken conceals the role of the state in 
creating and perpetuating interlocal inequality by invoking the 
seeming neutrality and naturalness of local borders. In asserting that 
suburban municipalities could not be held responsible for acts taking 
place within Detroit, the Court elided the fact that those 
municipalities, as well as Detroit, are all creatures of the state. As 
such, any action taken by the state of Michigan (including the 
intentional discrimination the district court found) is attributable to 
its delegates.256 If municipalities are simply creatures of the state, 
then the distinction between Bloomfield Hills and Detroit has no 
normative significance.257 But imperio home rule gives local 
governments a status more elevated than the mere “creature,” that 
of a state within a state, an organic expression of popular will.258 In 
this way, home rule deflects the state’s responsibility for actions taken 
within the local government’s autonomous sphere and makes those 
actions appear to result from “voluntary” local decisions rather than 
from state mandates. 
At least two important consequences follow from home rule’s 
deceptive treatment of the relationship between state and local in the 
arena of family affairs (which I have defined to include school 
control and land use). First, the state’s regulation of the family, while 
disguised, is also legitimized by reference to the local. As Joan 
Williams perceptively writes, in the aftermath of the Civil Rights 
movement and the Warren Court’s recognition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had incorporated the Bill of Rights’ protections against 
the states, it was problematic for the Court to endorse any notion of 
 
 256.  See id. at 770 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that constitutional violations “were 
committed by governmental entities for which the State is responsible”); id. at 808 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (opining that a state should not “be allowed to hide behind its delegation and 
compartmentalization of school districts to avoid its constitutional obligations to 
its children”). 
 257.  See id. at 759 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a matter of Michigan law the State 
itself has the final say as to where and how school district lines should be drawn.”); Ford, supra 
note 81, at 1862 (“If local government is only a delegate, then all local concerns are really 
state concerns, all local policies really state policies, all local citizens really only state citizens, 
and all local elections really sub-state elections.”). 
 258.  As discussed supra note 94, some theorists like Petr Kropotkin and Jerry Frug 
believed that the “state within a state” concept was inconsistent with liberalism’s drive for 
centralization. The analysis in the text shows, however, that the rhetoric of decentralization 
often supports centralization. See Ford, supra note 224, at 889 (stating that local difference is 
“a mechanism of the centralization of power”). 
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states’ rights in opposition to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims 
in Rodriguez and Milliken.259 Using the notion of separate spheres to 
decisively separate the state from the local, and then identifying 
matters related to the family as peculiarly local, enabled the Court to 
circumvent this difficulty. Indeed, Williams expressly analogizes the 
Court’s rhetorical move in these cases to the classical juridical effort 
to identify distinct spheres of activity.260 Second, home rule masks the 
negative consequences of state policy decisions regarding the home 
and family. For example, it has been well documented that requiring 
municipalities to finance services from local property taxes gives 
municipalities an incentive to use their zoning power to exclude uses 
that do not contribute positively to the tax base (a practice known as 
exclusionary zoning).261 Exclusionary zoning, as I have discussed 
earlier, leads to sprawl, interlocal fiscal inequalities, de facto racial 
segregation, and other problems.262 But because the Rodriguez 
Court characterizes local fiscal assets as something municipalities are 
naturally “blessed” with, exclusionary zoning and its consequences 
likewise appear to be natural and inevitable, rather than the 
consequences of state choices. 
It is true that, at least on occasion, the Court must make good 
on its rhetoric of local control when there is a direct conflict between 
states and local governments. Thus, in the case of Washington v. 
Seattle School District No. 1,263 the Court actually held that a 
statewide initiative could not override a city’s race-based school 
assignment scheme, citing Milliken for the proposition that local 
control of schools was a fundamental principle that states could not 
violate.264 But even in cases where local control of the family is 
vindicated, the invisible hand of the state is present. Although 
localities are often cast as the defenders of the home and family 
against the incursions of the outside world (including, as in Seattle, 
the state), it is ultimately the state rather than local governments that 
 
 259.  See Williams, supra note 125, at 106–15. 
 260.  See id. at 115–16. 
 261.  See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 7, at 148–61 (discussing how state policies 
structure local governments’ exercise of the land use power); see also supra notes 17–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 262.  See supra notes 17–19, 127 and accompanying text. 
 263.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 264.  See id. at 480–82. 
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defines the family that local governments are then tasked to defend. 
One of the express limitations on local governments’ home-rule 
powers in most states is that they cannot legislate in matters of 
“private law,” which is usually construed to mean that local 
governments have no authority to make substantive decisions about 
the content of family law.265 This limitation was dramatized when the 
city of San Francisco attempted a highly publicized but ultimately 
futile effort to confer marriage licenses on homosexual couples.266 
Thus, while land-use regulation and school control are mechanisms 
through which local governments may protect the family, they can 
only protect the normative conception of the family that the state 
has itself produced. Perhaps for this reason, though local land-use 
control is often lauded for allowing municipalities to meet their 
communities’ unique needs and circumstances,267 most municipalities 
nationwide have strikingly similar land-use laws.268 Not surprisingly, 
the land-use regime adopted by the vast majority of communities is a 
banal single-use zoning scheme that rigidly separates home from 
work, thereby reinforcing the market/family distinction.269 Yet, the 
 
 265.  See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 123, at 155. 
 266.  See id. at 148–50 (discussing efforts by San Francisco and other cities to issue same-
sex marriage licenses); David J. Barron, Why (And When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the 
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218 (2006). Notably, in his discussion of how the state 
“produces” localism as a means of asserting state control over the local, Richard Ford 
analogizes this “production” to the Victorian-era movement to control human sexuality by 
similarly “producing” it (i.e., categorizing and defining all kinds of sexual behavior). See Ford, 
supra note 224, at 906–09. Ford criticizes Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which 
vindicated local efforts to provide civil rights protections to homosexuals against a state effort 
to deprive those protections, as an example of how sexual behavior is controlled by being 
confined to a particular local territory. See Ford, supra note 224, at 922–28. Hence, in Romer, 
the discourse of the local and the discourse of the family are fused in a way that, while 
purporting to empower the local, actually limits it. 
 267.  See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 85 (1981) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (“[A] community of people are—within limits—masters of their 
own environment . . . .”). 
 268.  See DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION 65 (4th ed. 2012) (“Zoning 
ordinances throughout the United States tend to be remarkably similar in their features despite 
the fact that no overarching federal law dictates uniformity.”). 
 269.  Single-use or “Euclidean” zoning became and remained the predominant form of 
zoning after the U.S. Commerce Department promulgated the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act (SSZEA) in 1922, which authorized municipalities to enact single-use zoning 
ordinances. The popularity of single-use zoning was further cemented by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), upholding the 
constitutionality of single-use zoning. See Stahl, supra note 72, at 1257–60 (2008) (discussing 
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imperio idea that local government is the realm of home and family 
makes these zoning schemes appear as natural products of local 
choice and thus obscures the role of the state in defining and 
controlling the family. 
E. The Resurgence of the Local in the Time of Globalization 
To summarize the previous two sections, the notion embodied in 
imperio home rule that the state is the appropriate level for 
regulating the market and the local is the appropriate level for 
regulating the family enables both capital and the state to exercise 
hegemony over the local while disguising that hegemony under the 
guise of an ideologically neutral territorial divide. An essentially 
political decision about the scalar division of power is given the 
appearance of an objective, technical decision capable of impartial 
judicial divination. 
If Marx were correct, though, this situation would be inherently 
unstable, for eventually capital would come to dominate the state 
just as it has the local sphere. As we recall, Marx argued that 
liberalism could not contain capitalism because, by its very nature, 
capitalism resists being contained; the creation of separate spheres 
would only leave capital free to manipulate the different spheres, and 
the state, though asserting its “emancipation” from capital, would 
ultimately become subservient to capital.270 Indeed, in our current 
era of globalization, the liberal alliance between the state and capital 
has begun to unravel. While for a time capitalism tied its fortunes to 
the liberal state and the state reciprocated by regulating capital with 
a light hand,271 globalization has driven a wedge between them 
because capital’s increasing mobility threatens to undermine the 
territorial basis of the nation-state’s authority. The borderless nature 
of capital is, in other words, difficult to reconcile with the 
geographic boundedness of nation-states.272 An outpouring of 
 
SSZEA); id. at 1263–68 (discussing Euclid); id. at 1268–72 (discussing the continuing 
popularity of Euclidean zoning). 
 270.  See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See, e.g., FERGUSON & MANSBACH, supra note 153, at 40–69 (describing historical 
relations between nation-state and capital). 
 272.  See RITZER, supra note 165, at 12 (“Is there a successful way of reconciling the 
boundary transgressing character of markets with the boundary maintaining activities of 
nation-states?”); Guillén, supra note 153 (summarizing the debate about whether 
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literature shows how globalization has weakened the authority of the 
nation-state as borders have become increasingly porous and 
unmanageable.273 Because national authority, like local authority, is 
spatially bounded while capitalism is unbounded, the ability of 
national governments to regulate capital is inherently limited. 
Nevertheless, and as Marx would again predict, imperio home 
rule disguises capital’s power over the state just as it disguises 
capital’s power over the local, allowing the state to maintain its 
pretense of being emancipated from capitalism. In his classic essay 
On the Jewish Question, Marx argued that the distinction between the 
state and civil society served the purpose of making the state appear 
to be universal, even as the state served the interests of capital, 
because that distinction enabled the state to present itself in an 
exaggerated contrast with the evident parochialism of the private 
sphere.274 As Marx wrote, the state is emancipated “politically” from 
civil society because it “is conscious of being a political state and 
manifests its universality only in opposition to” the realm of civil 
society.275 Yet, the state’s universality was “unreal” because it had not 
effected true “human” emancipation, the liberation of humanity 
from enslavement to economic affairs.276 
Marx’s analysis illuminates the relationship between the state and 
capital under imperio home rule. In American Financial Services, we 
recall, the court held that the state, as opposed to the local, was the 
appropriate level of government to regulate capital because the state 
can assure uniformity in commercial regulation that local 
governments cannot.277 The court’s implicit assertion is that the state 
is appropriately scaled to regulate mobile capital. But, as we have just 
seen, it is doubtful that the state is so appropriately scaled. In 
 
globalization and increasing capital mobility have diminished authority of the nation-state). 
Guillén quotes political theorist Michael Mosher: “[I]s there a successful way of reconciling the 
boundary trangressing character of markets with the boundary maintaining activities of nation-
states?” See id. at 12.  
 273.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 153. 
 274.  See Marx, supra note 63, at 31–34. At this time, Marx had not yet developed his 
very sophisticated critique of capitalism, but his criticism of the liberal state for disguising the 
predominance of economic considerations in human affairs presages his later theory of how the 
state’s pretense of universality masks class conflict and the predominance of capitalism. 
 275.  Id. at 31. 
 276.  See id. at 32–34. 
 277.  See supra notes 28–45 and accompanying text. 
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accordance with Marx’s analysis, imperio home rule enables the state 
to “manifest its universality . . . in opposition to” the particularism of 
the local sphere, although that universality is, in fact, “unreal” 
because the state is incapable of regulating mobile capital. 
Moreover, in holding that states are more appropriately scaled to 
regulate capital than local governments, courts like American 
Financial Services may have matters exactly backward. As Saskia 
Sassen has argued, the agglomeration advantages of cities and their 
connections with other global cities makes them crucial nodes in the 
network of global capitalism.278 Globalization has not meant 
despatialization but rather an intensified interest by capital in the 
advantages of particular places, which actually reduces capital 
mobility by making capitalism somewhat dependent on place.279 This 
dependency enables at least some local governments to regulate 
capital without fear of capital flight, in marked contrast to Logan and 
Molotch’s portrayal of mobile capital cynically manipulating local 
governments.280 Indeed, the very reason why capital investors often 
insist on uniform statewide financial regulation in cases like 
American Financial Services is because they cannot simply shift their 
investment to other localities in response to undesirable 
local regulation. 
Cities also have another advantage over nation-states in 
regulating mobile capital: the right incentives. If globalization has 
enhanced the importance of cities as economic centers, it has also 
made cities the focal points for global troubles—climate change, 
financial ruin, economic inequality, terrorism, and more.281 As 
Zygmunt Bauman states, “cities have become dumping grounds for 
globally begotten problems.”282 Ninety percent of the world’s cities 
are located on bodies of water that stand to be affected by climate 
 
 278.  See SASSEN, supra note 215, at 346–55; RITZER, supra note 165, at 421–25. 
 279.  See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 146, at 293−95 (arguing that globalization has 
enhanced competition among capitalists for access to most advantageous places). 
 280.  Yishai Blank explains how cities have become critical components within a global 
“governance” network. According to Blank, cities have taken on this role because “they seem 
to embody many of the values that global governance wishes to advance: decentralization of 
power, voluntariness, participation, and responsiveness.” See Blank, supra note 21, at 521–22. 
On Logan and Molotch’s argument that capital mobility enables capital to exploit local 
governments, see supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 281.  See RITZER, supra note 165, at 426–29. 
 282.  ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID LOVE 101 (2003). 
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change.283 Poor cities like Oakland and Detroit, as we have seen, 
were ravaged by the global recession. Cities are sites of the most 
extreme global wealth inequality, home to those made rich by 
globalization and those impoverished by it.284 They are magnets for 
immigrants and tempting targets for international terrorists.285 The 
imminence of these global challenges at the local level means that 
local governments must take practical steps to address these issues 
and cannot fall prey to the ideological disputes that hamstring state 
and federal authorities.286 This may explain why, as we saw earlier, 
cities like Oakland were so much more prescient about the 
impending global financial collapse than state and federal 
regulators—these cities saw capitalism’s practical impacts on their 
neighborhoods and were forced to act. 
Of course, imperio home rule prevented Oakland from 
restraining predatory lending and it did so under the logic that states 
are better suited than localities to regulate capital. But in an age of 
globalization, it is becoming clear that exactly the opposite is the 
case. In this context, imperio home rule simply allows capital to 
exercise dominion over both state and local authorities. 
III. A NEW MODEL OF HOME RULE 
As the previous section demonstrated, globalization challenges 
the idea that there is a natural scale at which regulation of any 
particular matter should or does occur.287 The assignment of 
particular functions to particular scalar levels is, as Yishai Blank states, 
 
 283.  See BARBER, supra note 6, at 130. 
 284.  See SASSEN, supra note 215, at 351 (observing that the global city is a site of 
“economic and spatial polarization because of the disproportionate concentration of very high 
and very low income jobs”). 
 285.  See RITZER, supra note 165, at 426. 
 286.  See BARBER, supra note 6, at 98–102 (stressing the need for urban leaders to be 
pragmatic and eschew ideology when dealing with global challenges). 
 287.  See, e.g., Blank, supra note 21, at 556–57 (arguing that globalization subjects our 
judgments about the proper allocation of power between centralized and decentralized 
authorities to “constant empirical challenge”); Reynolds, supra note 16, at 1290 (noting that 
“interconnection” has made statewide and local concerns extremely difficult to distinguish). 
Reynolds cites City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Colo. 2002) (observing 
that increasing metropolitan area integration may change “local” concerns into “statewide” 
issues), and City of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 755 (Colo. 2001) (concluding that 
globalization increases the need for uniformity of regulation). 
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“a normative question and a profoundly political one,” rather than 
“merely a technical one.”288 Even Michael Walzer, a passionate 
defender of the liberal separation of spheres, argues that the public, 
rather than the courts, must determine where to place the boundary 
lines between the spheres. “Believers, scholars, workers and parents 
establish the lines—and then the citizens as a body do so, through 
the political process.”289 Imperio home rule precludes this political 
process by transforming normative questions about the allocation of 
governmental power into technical questions better suited for the 
judiciary than for public contestation.290 It follows that we need a 
new conception of home rule that acknowledges the frankly political 
nature of any choice about how to apportion power between states 
and local governments so as to invite an open dialogue about that 
apportionment. This Part briefly considers how we might revise 
home rule to accomplish that end. 
A. The Legislative Model 
One potential adaptation of home rule along the lines I suggest 
already exists in the form of the “legislative” home-rule model. 
During the 1950s, several municipal reform groups, including the 
National Municipal League and the National League of Cities, 
attempted to formulate a new approach to home rule. The reformers 
were disenchanted with the imperio model because, in their view, 
courts had so rigidly constricted the meaning of the term “local” as 
to effectively disable local governments vis-à-vis states.291 The 
reformers understood that the terms “statewide” and “local” had no 
fixed meaning capable of judicial determination but were laden with 
value judgments more appropriately made by legislators than courts. 
According to Jefferson Fordham, one of the leaders of the reform 
movement, the imperio model’s state/local distinction improperly 
“shift[ed] largely political questions to the judicial forum for 
 
 288.  See Blank, supra note 21, at 556. 
 289.  Walzer, supra note 55, at 328. 
 290.  Cf. Olsen, supra note 57, at 1564 (“Dividing life between market and family 
compartmentalizes human experience in a way that prevents us from realizing the range of 
choices actually available to us.”). As observed supra note 197, home rule has many of the 
characteristics of a nonjusticiable political question. 
 291.  See Diller, supra note 17, at 1124–27. 
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decision.”292 The reformers advocated a new form of home rule 
under which states could simply delegate to local governments all the 
powers that states themselves possessed, regardless of whether the 
power was characterized as local or statewide (though the state could 
reserve to itself the right to act exclusively in specific subject-matter 
areas).293 According to Paul Diller, this model “intended to 
substitute the legislature for the judiciary as the primary adjudicator 
of the extent of home rule powers”294 and accordingly became 
known as the “legislative” home-rule model (or alternatively the 
Fordham model or the NML/NLC model). 
Conceptually, the legislative model was a breakthrough because 
it undermined the notion that there are distinct spheres for state and 
local action and recognized that states and local government 
effectively have overlapping areas of authority. And, ironically, 
though the legislative model sees local governments largely as “state 
creatures” rather than as semi-autonomous “states within a state,” 
local governments may actually have more power under the 
legislative than the imperio model because the legislative model 
enables local governments to perform any governmental functions 
that have not been expressly reserved by the state, without 
interference by the often-hostile judiciary. 
Nevertheless, despite the legislative reforms, the imperio model 
of home rule has remained predominant. Though approximately half 
the states that have home rule have formally adopted the legislative 
model,295 in substance imperio home rule remains the order of the 
day in most of these states. For one thing, despite the legislative 
model’s effort to shift power away from the judiciary, courts still play 
an important role in determining whether a particular matter has in 
fact been preempted by the state.296 And, in resolving this question, 
 
 292.  See MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUN. HOME RULE § 6 cmt. 3 
(JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, COMM. ON HOME RULE, AM. MUN. ASS’N 1953). 
 293.  See MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.02 (NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, 6th ed. rev. 
1968); see also Barron, supra note 14, at 2325-27; Sandalow, supra note 106, at 685-92. 
 294.  Diller, supra note 17, at 1126. 
 295.  See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, app. at 1374 (containing a comprehensive 
appendix listing home rule status of all fifty states). According to Baker and Rodriguez’s study, 
twenty-three states have imperio home rule, twenty-three have legislative home rule, and the 
remainder do not have home rule. 
 296.  See Diller, supra note 17, at 1126. 
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courts frequently call upon the statewide/local distinction that the 
legislative model supposedly repudiated. For instance, some courts in 
legislative states continue to ask whether a matter is statewide or 
local in nature before considering a preemption challenge.297 Other 
courts determine whether local action is impliedly preempted by 
examining, among other things, whether the matter at hand is local 
or statewide,298 using the traditional imperio factors of uniformity 
and extraterritorial impact to guide the analysis.299 Of course, this 
approach is entirely inconsistent with the legislative model, under 
which the local government is entitled to do anything that the state 
itself can do, including acting in matters of statewide concern, unless 
the state has expressed a clear intent to preempt the local 
government. In other words, courts are still using the conceptual 
tools of the imperio model, even within an analytical framework that 
was supposed to free local governments from the strictures of the 
statewide/local distinction. It is clear that the judiciary’s attachment 
to the liberal separation of spheres remains strong in the arena of 
home rule.300 
 
 297.  See City of Tucson v. Consumers for Retail Choice Sponsored by Wal-Mart, 5 P.3d 
934, 936–37 (Ariz. 2000) (holding that matters of purely local concern are immune from 
state preemption). 
 298.  See Mack Paramus Co. v. Mayor of Paramus, 511 A.2d 1179 (N.J. 1986) (listing 
the need for statewide uniformity as one factor in implied preemption analysis); Duff v. Twp. 
of Northampton, 532 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (holding a local hunting 
ordinance preempted by state law because “municipalities have been granted limited police 
power over matters of local concern” and the scope of municipal power “does not extend to 
subjects inherently in need of uniform treatment or to matters of general public interest which 
necessarily require an exclusive state policy”); see also GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE 
CITIES 79 (1985) (“[C]ourts have often read imperio-type language into the NLC [National 
League of Cities] provision, restricting the municipal initiative to the sphere of local affairs.”). 
As we have already seen, though California is an imperio state, the California Supreme Court 
in American Financial Services used a similarly tortuous logic to find Oakland’s predatory 
lending ordinance preempted. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
 299.  See cases cited supra note 298 and Reynolds, supra note 16, at 1288 (observing 
that in legislative home rule states, the extraterritorial impact factor is “a tool of 
implied preemption”). 
 300.  In their comprehensive recent article on imperio home rule, Lynn Baker and Dan 
Rodriguez largely absolve the judiciary of responsibility for perpetuating the imperio model, 
arguing that the courts are faithfully attempting to interpret the language of state constitutions 
that expressly limit home rule to “local” matters. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 
1366. The fact that courts have imported the statewide/local distinction into legislative home-
rule states that have disavowed that limitation, however, shows that imperio home rule is at 
least as much a creature of the judiciary as it is the state constitutions. 
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B. A Global Home-rule Model 
Even if it did work precisely as intended, the legislative model 
would still be troubling because it fails to acknowledge the 
importance of the local in our global age. Legislative home rule 
deliberately returns local governments to the status of state creatures, 
which it was the very purpose of home rule to change. While in 
practice, as I have just indicated, the legislative model may actually 
give local governments greater power than the imperio model, 
conceptually it enervates local governments because it theorizes 
them as mere administrative conveniences of the state, with no 
inherent connection to the lived experience or democratic aspirations 
of the local people. As such, it leaves us with an impoverished idea of 
the place of local governments in our political system. Recognizing 
that the distribution of power between state and local governments 
is a normative question that should be politically rather than 
judicially contested would be meaningless if our preconception of 
the local is that it has no identity distinct from the state.301 
The imperio model, for all its flaws, at least enables us to 
envision the local as a vital site of democratic self-government. 
Though I have devoted considerable energy to maligning the liberal 
separation of spheres, it does have the virtue of affirming that there 
is a role for local governments within our constitutional order, that 
local governments are representatives of a local public rather than 
simply bureaucratic arms of the state. The legislative model, with all 
its postmodern mushiness, does little to help us define our vision of 
the local. In her critique of the liberal dichotomy between 
male/female and market/family, Frances Olsen strikes a similar 
chord. She writes that  
[t]he division of human beings into male and female could be 
judged to have been a useful device for enabling us to become 
conscious of the wide range of human possibilities. The 
transcending of the male/female dichotomy would then be the 
 
 301.  Cf. Frug, supra note 151, at 334–35 (arguing that the postmodern conception of 
local government has the virtue of recognizing the porousness of local borders, but because it 
is so amorphous, it lacks “the capacity to nurture a sense of community”). 
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final step in the reclamation of the whole self, the last stage in this 
historical process.302  
Likewise, the statewide/local dichotomy was perhaps a “useful 
device” enabling us to “become conscious of the wide range of” 
local possibilities. 
A good example of how useful imperio home rule may have been 
is San Francisco’s aforementioned effort to address gay marriage by 
attempting (unsuccessfully) to issue same-sex marriage licenses. San 
Francisco was unsuccessful because, despite the shopworn liberal idea 
that the local is the sphere of the family, local governments are 
actually rather circumscribed in regulating family matters. Home rule 
is often interpreted to preclude the making of family law. But there is 
another way to see the San Francisco case. Arguably, the city was 
emboldened to take on gay marriage because the imperio conception 
gave it the confidence to believe it had the power to define the 
family, a power it would not have as a mere creature of the state.303 
Though its actions were ultimately invalidated, it could be argued 
that San Francisco lit the spark that eventually led to widespread 
public and judicial acceptance of gay marriage a decade later. 
Maybe, then, imperio home rule has been “a useful device for 
enabling us to become conscious of the wide range of human 
possibilities,” in Olsen’s terms.304 Our “final step in the reclamation 
of the whole self,” then, would be “the transcending of the 
[local/statewide] dichotomy.” In other words, we need a model of 
home rule that recognizes the vitality of the local but does not create 
 
 302.  See Olsen, supra note 57, at 1570–71. 
 303.  See Arlington Cty. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (holding that a statute 
authorizing municipalities to provide health benefits to employees and their dependents did 
not include authority to define dependents to encompass same-sex partners). 
 304.  I expect disagreement on my point that imperio home rule enables local 
governments to act boldly in the belief that they have some conceptual room for action. 
Benjamin Barber argues, for example, that the key to local government innovation in the 
global age is that local governments are powerless and know themselves to be powerless. 
According to Barber, this knowledge requires local governments to be creative and pragmatic, 
and to form networks with other cities around the world. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 23, 
70−71, 149. On the other hand, Barron, Frug, and Su argue that the uncertainty surrounding 
the scope of local governments’ home rule powers makes municipalities extraordinarily timid 
because they are worried that anything they might do could be invalidated as exceeding their 
home rule authority. See DAVID J. BARRON ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE: 
LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON 9–12 (2004). This question calls for further 
empirical examination. 
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a fixed and unalterable distinction between statewide and local 
spheres. In our law, such a framework is missing, but considering the 
role that globalization has played in exposing the unworkability of 
the imperio model, it makes sense that we look to the arena of global 
governance for a new approach to local home rule. Indeed, the 
model World Charter of Local Self-Government, drafted by the 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme and organizations 
of city governments, provides a useful template. In pertinent part, 
the World Charter provides: 
Article 2. The principle of local self-government shall be 
recognized in national legislation, and where practicable 
guaranteed in the constitution. 
Article 3. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of 
local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and 
manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own 
responsibility and in the interests of the local population.305 
Like imperio home rule, the World Charter provision recognizes 
that local governments are a vital part of any political order, and thus 
requires states to carve out a significant role for local authority. 
Unlike the imperio model, however, the Charter leaves the precise 
role of local governments undefined and is blessedly free of any 
territorial or scalar conception of local power. This framing invites a 
debate about the scope of local government authority while 
establishing as a baseline that there should be some meaningful 
division of power between state and local. In doing so, the charter 
avoids the imperio model’s flaw of defining local power so 
specifically that it is inflexible and the legislative model’s flaw of 
defining it so amorphously that local power becomes a mere fig leaf. 
How exactly would these charter provisions work in practice? If 
some language were incorporated into state constitutions broadly 
reserving a role for local governments, it would not automatically 
solve the problem of how to distribute power between states and 
municipalities. State legislatures would still have to make substantive 
 
 305.  See U.N. Ctr. for Human Settlements (Habitat) and World Ass’ns of Cities and 
Local Auths. Coordination, Towards a World Charter of Local Self-Government (May 25, 
1998), http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/charter.html; see also Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, 
International Local Government Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1, 29 (2006) (discussing the 
World Charter). 
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decisions about what powers to retain and what powers to delegate 
to the local level, and courts would still have to resolve litigation that 
would arise as to the scope of the delegated powers. So what will 
have been achieved? Such language, if adopted in state constitutions, 
would hopefully have two felicitous consequences: first, it would 
signal to the public that the allocation of power between state and 
local governments is a normative political question that has no 
objective resolution, thus inviting the public to a broad discussion 
about how to allocate power free from technical or scalar 
preconceptions; and second, it would signal to the judiciary that 
courts must steer clear of attempting to discern the appropriate 
boundary between state and local authority. If all the relevant actors 
take their cues, we can finally have a long overdue conversation 
about the fate of local home rule in this time of globalization. 
CONCLUSION 
The terms “statewide concern” and “local concern” have no 
inherent meaning. These terms are only given meaning as we 
experience the ways state and local governments affect our lives. As 
such, the question of how power is to be divided between these 
authorities is one for the public to decide in an ongoing process of 
discourse and debate, and it is a question we must be free to revisit 
as our experience dictates. The first step toward achieving this end is 
to discard a model of home rule that depicts the state and local as 
impregnable spheres of authority capable of objective divination by 
an impartial judiciary. 
